El trabajo presenta la conjetura de que los mundos posibles son universales estructurales máximos. En primer lugar, se explican brevemente las diferentes concepciones actualistas existentes sobre los mundos posibles y los problemas sistemáticos que deben enfrentar. Se argumenta que la conjetura presentada muestra cómo todas esas concepciones pueden ser unificadas en una teoría única y simple. En segundo lugar, se explica por qué la mejor alternativa para la constitución del espacio modal son los universales trascendentes. Finalmente, se indican brevemente algunas (...) dificultades para la concepción presentada. Una justificación definitiva de la conjetura deberá consistir principalmente en la solución de esas dificultades. The work presents the conjecture that possible worlds are maximal structural universals. First, the paper explains roughly the different actualist extant conceptions of possible worlds and the systematic problems they have to face. It is argued that the conjecture presented shows how all those different conceptions can be unified in a single simple theory. Second, it is explained why the best alternative for the constitution of the modal space is a domain of transcendent universals. Finally, some difficulties for the conception are briefly indicated. A definitive justification of the conjecture presented should consist mainly in tackling those difficulties. (shrink)

Some platonists truly agonize over the ontological commitments which their platonism demands of them. Peter van Inwagen, for example, confesses candidly,I am happy to admit that I am uneasy about believing in the existence of ‘causally irrelevant’ objects. The fact that abstract objects, if they exist, can be neither causes or [sic] effects is one of the many features of abstract objects that make nominalism so attractive. I should very much like to be a nominalist, but I don't see how (...) to be one …. (shrink)

Epistemology is sometimes said to be a normative discipline, but what this characterization means is often left unclear. This paper distinguishes two kinds of normativity and thereby provides a new way of understanding attributions of normativity. Associated with this distinction are two kinds of epistemological reflection. These are shown to be parallel to two kinds of ethical reflection. In the light of what emerges in showing these points, the paper clarifies the requirements for naturalizing epistemology, the place normativity might have, (...) given certain kinds of naturalization, and the sense in which knowledge and justification may be viewed as normative. (shrink)

The question of how properties are individuated is extremely important. Consider the following proposals. To be in pain is to be in a certain neurological state. To be red is to appear red to normal observers in standard conditions. To be obligatory is to maximize the good. Each makes a claim of property identity. Each is a substantive metaphysical thesis of wide interest. None can be studied with due scrutiny in the absence of a general account of property identity. Here, (...) I will survey existing accounts and suggest a new account in terms of grounding that has some advantages over the other candidates. (shrink)