Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Intensional Protocols for Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Suzanne Wijk, Rasmus Rendsvig & Hanna Lee - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1077-1118.
    In dynamical multi-agent systems, agents are controlled by protocols. In choosing a class of formal protocols, an implicit choice is made concerning the types of agents, actions and dynamics representable. This paper investigates one such choice: An intensional protocol class for agent control in dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), called ‘DEL dynamical systems’. After illustrating how such protocols may be used in formalizing and analyzing information dynamics, the types of epistemic temporal models that they may generate are characterized. This facilitates a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Intensional Protocols for Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Hanna S. van Lee, Rasmus K. Rendsvig & Suzanne van Wijk - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1077-1118.
    In dynamical multi-agent systems, agents are controlled by protocols. In choosing a class of formal protocols, an implicit choice is made concerning the types of agents, actions and dynamics representable. This paper investigates one such choice: An intensional protocol class for agent control in dynamic epistemic logic, called ‘DEL dynamical systems’. After illustrating how such protocols may be used in formalizing and analyzing information dynamics, the types of epistemic temporal models that they may generate are characterized. This facilitates a formal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Arbitrary arrow update logic.Hans van Ditmarsch, Wiebe van der Hoek, Barteld Kooi & Louwe B. Kuijer - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence 242 (C):80-106.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • True lies.Thomas Ågotnes, Hans van Ditmarsch & Yanjing Wang - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4581-4615.
    A true lie is a lie that becomes true when announced. In a logic of announcements, where the announcing agent is not modelled, a true lie is a formula that becomes true when announced. We investigate true lies and other types of interaction between announced formulas, their preconditions and their postconditions, in the setting of Gerbrandy’s logic of believed announcements, wherein agents may have or obtain incorrect beliefs. Our results are on the satisfiability and validity of instantiations of these semantically (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations