This article, while disclosing the conception of rights, their relation to law and their nature, presents the constructive criticism and motivated support of legal personalism, i. e. the original theory presented by prof. A. Vaišvila. This article presents the criticism of terms “positive law” and “natural law”. It emphasizes that the term “natural rights,” while historically very important and common, is rarely used of late. The primary reason for its fall from favor seems to be that it was used in (...) too many different ways and therefore ceased to be useful. So, the author, while defending the indispensable relation between law and morals, offers the term “good morals” instead of “natural law” and also offers to refuse the usage of terms “positive law” and “natural law”. This article represents the view that morality is the source of law. The author accepts a position asserting that the terms “human rights”, “natural rights” and “fundamental moral rights” are synonymous. However, some institutional rights (for example, social rights) flow from statutes, but not morals. (shrink)