Despite being very common in both public and private argumentation, accusations of selective application of general premises, also known as “whataboutisms”, have been mostly overlooked in argumentation studies, where they are, at most, taken as accusations of inconsistency. Here I will defend an account according to which allegations of this sort can express the suspicion that the argumentation put forward by one party does not reflect his or her actual standpoint and reasons. Distinguishing this kind of argumentative moves is important (...) for evaluating its appropriateness in critical discussions where knowing the honest opinion of arguers is relevant, as in political controversies or interpersonal communication. (shrink)

This paper discusses the ways in which argumentative discourse prototypically manifests itself. As a consequence of the institutional preconditions applying to the strategic manoeuvring taking place in specific communicative activity types, certain context-dependent argumentative patterns of standpoints, argument schemes and argumentation structures can be observed. Because of their interest in the extent to which argumentative discourse is context-dependent, pragma-dialecticians are out to discover such specific patterns. As a case in point, the authors discuss some institutionally motivated argumentative patterns in parliamentary (...) debate in the European Parliament. (shrink)

In order for confrontational strategic manoeuvring, aimed at defining in a reasonable way the difference of opinion to one’s own advantage, to be sound, arguers’ attempt to arrive at a particular definition must not prevent other definitions from coming about. This paper discusses the ad hominem fallacy as an obstruction of the procedure of critical testing as a result of failure to meet this particular soundness conditions.