Universities are under increasing pressure to demonstrate the economic and social relevance of the research they produce. In the UK, for example, recent developments in the UK under the Research Excellence Framework (REF) suggest that future funding schemes will grant “significant additional recognition…where researchers build on excellent research to deliver demonstrable benefits to the economy, society, public policy, culture and quality of life” (HEFCE 2009 ). Having conceded that this and similar developments are likely to continue into the future, this (...) paper explores the problematic ethical terrain facing philosophers of education under increasing pressure to produce work that has unambiguous, demonstrable practical value on terms offered by various funding regimes. A preliminary ethics of relevance is developed through an examination of the debate between John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas on the relationship between philosophy, public policy and public reason. The paper then articulates and defends a principle of legitimate relevance . This principle is then applied to the case of directing disciplinary competence in philosophy of education for the educational policy process as a means to producing social and economic benefits. (shrink)

This paper considers the roles and definitions of expert and lay members of ethics committees, focussing on those given by the National Research Ethics Service which is mandated to review all research conducted in National Health Service settings in the United Kingdom. It questions the absence of a specified position for the ‘professional ethicist’ and suggests that such individuals will often be lay members of ethics committees, their participation being a reflection of their academic interest and expertise. The absence of (...) a specified position for professional ethicists and the concomitant but implicit denial of ethical expertise appear to be an anomalous state of affairs if one considers that the training offered to members of ethics committees is often delivered by academic ethicists. It is suggested that this is based on a misunderstanding of the concept ‘ethical expertise’ and that properly understood the ethicist can assist the work of ethics committees by drawing on their expert knowledge. (shrink)

Services of ethics consultants are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as engineering, public administration, business, law, health care, journalism, and scientific research. It has however been maintained that use of ethics consultants is incompatible with personal autonomy; in moral matters individuals should be allowed to make their own decisions. The problem this criticism refers to can be conceived of as a conflict between the professional autonomy of ethics experts and the autonomy of the persons they serve. (...) This paper addresses this conflict and maintains that when the nature of both ethics consultation and individual autonomy is properly understood, the professional autonomy of ethics experts is compatible with the autonomy of the persons they assist. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultants (CECs) work in complex environments ripe with multiple types of expectations. Significantly, some are due to the perspectives of professional colleagues and the patients and families with whom CECs consult and concern how CECs can, do, or should function, thus adding to the moral complexity faced by CECs in those particular circumstances. We outline six such common expectations: Ethics Police, Ethics Equalizer, Ethics Superhero, Ethics Expediter, Ethics Healer or Ameliorator, and, finally, Ethics Expert. Framed by examples of (...) requests for ethics consultation that illustrate each kind, along with brief descriptions, we argue that while these expectations ought to be resisted for clear and practical reasons, they also create opportunities for CECs to articulate, educate, and ultimately be responsible to the professional demands of clinical ethics work. Recognizing, acknowledging, and at times resisting those expectations thus become key activities and responsibilities in the performance of ethics consultation. (shrink)

As AI is linked to more and more aspects of our lives, the need for algorithms that can take decisions that are not only accurate but also fair becomes apparent. It can be seen both in discussions of future trends such as autonomous vehicles or the issue of superintelligence, as well as actual implementations of machine learning used to decide whether a person should be admitted in certain university or will be able to return a credit. In this paper, we (...) will use Dreyfus’ account on ethical expertise to show that, to give an AI some ability to make ethical judgements, a pure symbolic, conceptual approach is not enough. We also need the ability to make sense of the surroundings to reframe and define situations in a dynamic way, using multiple perspectives in a pre-reflective way. (shrink)

Philosophers and others have questioned whether or not expertise in morality is possible. This debate is not only theoretical, but also affects the perceived legitimacy of clinical ethicists. One argument against moral expertise is that in a pluralistic society with competing moral theories no one can claim expertise regarding what another ought morally to do. There are simply too many reasonable moral values and intuitions that affect theory choice and its application; expertise is epistemically uniform. In this article, we discuss (...) how similar concerns have recently threatened to undermine expertise in medicine and science. In contrast, we argue that the application of values is needed to exercise medical, scientific, and moral expertise. As long as these values are made explicit, worries about a pretense to authority in the context of a liberal democracy are ill-conceived. In conclusion, we argue for an expertise that is epistemically diverse. (shrink)

The multidisciplinary provenance of bioethics leads to a variety of discursive styles and ways of reasoning, making the discipline vulnerable to criticism and unwieldy to the setting of solid theoretical foundations. Applied ethics belongs to a group of disciplines that resort to deliberation rather than formal argumentation, therefore employing both factual and value propositions, as well as emotions, intuitions and other non logical elements. Deliberation is thus enriched to the point where ethical discourse becomes substantial rather than purely analytical. Caution (...) must be exercised to avoid this formal permissiveness from accepting empty and incorrigible statements that are but flatus voci since they can neither be supported nor falsified. It is therefore suggested that deliberation in bioethics should comply with three sets of conditions: (1) Be understandable, truthful, honest and pertinent, as suggested by communicative ethics; (2) Allow for second order, thick judgements as suggested by pragmatism; (3) Abide by additional criteria as here proposed: Doxastic propositions should be bolstered by a cognitive element; statements should be specific and proportional to the issue at hand, and they should be arguable and coherent. (shrink)

As a relational concept, responsible innovation can be made more tangible by asking innovation of what and responsibility of whom for what? Arranging the scattered field of responsible innovation comprehensively, starting from an anthropological point of view, into five fields of tension and five categories of spearheads, may be theoretically and practically helpful while offering suggestions for both research and management.

In this paper I will briefly discuss the role and function of the ethical advisory committees and other ethics bodies that are supposed to take care of the ethical dimension of the biotechnology strategies. The expert ethical advice has created colourful discussion in many contexts, but here I aim to analyze the role and relevance of ethical expertise in the context of national and regional biotechnology strategies. I will argue that it may be quite unproblematic that the work of the (...) ethics committees and other governmental and semi-governmental ethics bodies concerns only a relatively narrow range of issues and do not directly concern all the important social and economic realignments that accompany biotechnology. Many important decisions concerning national and regional biotechnology strategies are political, and typically ethics committees can be only indirectly useful in political decision-making. The committees should be free to refrain from extending their work to the areas where they are not already involved. However, the ethics committees and other ethics bodies can promote public debate that forms the basis for political decision-making. (shrink)

The nature, possibility, and implications of ethics expertise in general and of bioethics expertise in particular has been the focus of extensive debate for over thirty years. What is ethics expertise and what does it enable experts to do? Knowing what ethics expertise is can help answer another important question: What, if anything, makes a claim of expertise legitimate? In other words, how does someone earn the appellation “ethics expert?” There remains deep disagreement on whether ethics expertise is possible, and (...) if so, what constitutes such expertise and what it entails and legitimates. Discussion of bioethics expertise has become particularly important given the growing presence of bioethicists in the clinical setting as well as efforts to professionalize bioethics through codes of ethics and certification efforts. Unlike in the law or in engineering, where there may be a body of knowledge that professional organizations or others have articulated as important for education and training of experts, ethics expertise admits of no such body of knowledge or required experience. Nor is there an entity seen as having the authority to articulate the necessary scope of knowledge. Questions about whether there is such a body of knowledge for particular areas within bioethics have emerged and played a central role in professionalization efforts in recent years, especially in the area of clinical ethics. (shrink)

To address the moral questions in patient care and medical practice, Danish hospitals are starting to solicit clinical ethics committees. As in other places around the world, CECs in Denmark is an interdisciplinary group that includes physicians, nurses, social workers, psychologists, lawyers, chaplains, and sometimes lay persons. Due to their distinct professional background, members are largely untrained in concepts, skills and the language of moral philosophy and ethical reasoning. The absence of appropriate competencies makes it challenging for members to identify, (...) analyze and resolve lingering moral quandaries. Thus, the creation of CECs in Denmark has raised the question of qualifications for those who serve on a committee. When the Danish Society of Clinical Ethics was formed in 2012, it was therefore at the forefront of its agenda to establish a training program that would offer valuable contributions to the ethical aspect of medical decision making and to serve as an important resource for health care providers, patients and their families. This article describes the history, development and preliminary results of the current training program as well as reflects on future ideas for ethics education for Danish CECs and health care providers at large. (shrink)