Switch to: References

Citations of:

Revisionist Accounts of Free Will: Origins, Varieties, and Challenges

Manuel Vargas

In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press (2011)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Demystifying the Deep Self View.August Gorman - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (4):390-414.details Deep Self views of moral responsibility have been criticized for positing mysterious concepts, making nearly paradoxical claims about the ownership of one’s mental states, and promoting self-deceptive moral evasion. I defend Deep Self views from these pervasive forms of skepticism by arguing that some criticism is hasty and stems from epistemic injustice regarding testimonies of experiences of alienation, while other criticism targets contingent features of Deep Self views that ought to be abandoned. To aid in this project, I provide original (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Free actions as a natural kind.Oisín Deery - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):823-843.details Do we have free will? Understanding free will as the ability to act freely, and free actions as exercises of this ability, I maintain that the default answer to this question is “yes.” I maintain that free actions are a natural kind, by relying on the influential idea that kinds are homeostatic property clusters. The resulting position builds on the view that agents are a natural kind and yields an attractive alternative to recent revisionist accounts of free action. My view (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 10 citations
Companions in innocence: defending a new methodological assumption for theorizing about moral responsibility.Kelly McCormick - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):515-533.details The contemporary philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility is rife with appeal to a variety of allegedly intuitive cases and principles. As a result, some have argued that many strands of this debate end in “dialectical stalemates,” boiling down to bedrock, seemingly intractable disagreements about intuition . Here I attempt to carve out a middle ground between conventional reliance on appeal to intuition and intuitional skepticism in regards to the philosophical discussion of moral responsibility in particular. The main (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Basic desert, conceptual revision, and moral justification.Nadine Elzein - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):212-225.details I examine Manuel Vargas's revisionist justification for continuing with our responsibility-characteristic practices in the absence of basic desert. I query his claim that this justification need not depend on how we settle questions about the content of morality, arguing that it requires us to reject the Kantian principle that prohibits treating anyone merely as a means. I maintain that any convincing argument against this principle would have to be driven by concerns that arise within the sphere of moral theory itself, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Experimental evidence for free will revisionism.Chris Weigel - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):31 - 43.details Philosophers who theorize about whether free will is compatible with causal determinism often rely on ordinary intuitions to bolster their theory. A revisionist theory of free will takes a different approach, saying that the best philosophical theory of what we ought to think about free will conflicts with what we ordinarily do think about free will. I contend that revisionism has not been taken as seriously as should be because philosophers have not realized the extent to which ordinary intuitions are (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 8 citations
Free Will and Modern Science.M. Griffith - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):168-176.details Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

1