Despite advances in palliative care, some patients still suffer significantly at the end of life. Terminal Sedation (TS) refers to the use of sedatives in dying patients until the point of death. The following limits are commonly applied: (1) symptoms should be refractory, (2) sedatives should be administered proportionally to symptoms and (3) the patient should be imminently dying. The term ‘Expanded TS’ (ETS) can be used to describe the use of sedation at the end of life outside one or (...) more of these limits.In this paper, we explore and defend ETS, focusing on jurisdictions where assisted dying is lawful. We argue that ETS is morally permissible: (1) in cases of non-refractory suffering where earlier treatments are likely to fail, (2) where gradual sedation is likely to be ineffective or where unconsciousness is a clinically desirable outcome, (3) where the patient meets all criteria for assisted dying or (4) where the patient has greater than 2 weeks to live, is suffering intolerably, and sedation is considered to be the next best treatment option for their suffering.While remaining two distinct practices, there is scope for some convergence between the criteria for assisted dying and the criteria for ETS. Dying patients who are currently ineligible for TS, or even assisted dying, should not be left to suffer. ETS provides one means to bridge this gap. (shrink)

The main premise of the Royal Dutch Medical Association's (RDMA) guideline on palliative sedation is that palliative sedation, contrary to euthanasia, is normal medical practice. Although we do not deny the ethical distinctions between euthanasia and palliative sedation, we will critically analyse the guideline's argumentation strategy with which euthanasia is demarcated from palliative sedation. First, we will analyse the guideline's main premise, which entails that palliative sedation is normal medical treatment. After this, we will critically discuss three crucial propositions of (...) the guideline that are used to support this premise: (1) the patient's life expectancy should not exceed 2 weeks; (2) the aim of the physician should be to relieve suffering and (3) expert consultation is optional. We will conclude that, if inherent problematic aspects of palliative sedation are taken seriously, palliative sedation is less normal than it is now depicted in the guideline. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Palliative Sedierung als therapeutische Handlungsoption in anderweitig refraktären Behandlungssituationen wird in der Öffentlichkeit und in Fachkreisen in ihrer klinischen Wertigkeit grundsätzlich akzeptiert und weitgehend positiv konnotiert. Im Widerspruch dazu fallen sowohl die Quantität der empirischen Forschung als auch die Intensität der ethischen und klinischen Diskussion ins Auge, mit der konzeptuelle als auch durchführungsbezogene Aspekte der Palliativen Sedierung beschrieben und kontrovers erörtert werden. Anstatt eines distinkten Behandlungskonzeptes stellt sich hier eher ein komplexes Spektrum verschiedener Vorgehensweisen dar. Die folgende Übersichtsarbeit fasst (...) anhand der aktuellen Literatur zusammen, welche Aspekte im Kontext der Palliativen Sedierung als problematisch bewertet werden. (shrink)

Background Studies describing physicians’ experiences with sedation at the end of life are indispensible for informed palliative care practice, but they are scarce. We describe the accounts of physicians from the USA and the Netherlands, two countries with different regulations on end-of-life decisions regarding their use of sedation.Methods Qualitative face-to-face interviews were held in 2007–2008 with 36 physicians , including primary care physicians and specialists. We applied purposive sampling and conducted constant comparative analyses.Results In both countries, the use of sedation (...) was described in diverse terms, especially in the USA, and was often experienced as emotionally challenging. Respondents stated different and sometimes multiple intentions for their use of sedation. Besides alleviating severe suffering, most Dutch respondents justified its use by stating that it does not hasten death, while most American respondents indicated that it might hasten death but that this was justifiable as long as that was not their primary intention. While many Dutch respondents indicated that they initiated open discussions about sedation proactively to inform patients about their options and to allow planning, the accounts of American respondents showed fewer and less-open discussions, mostly late in the dying process and with the patient's relatives.Conclusions The justification for sedation and the openness with which it is discussed were found to differ in the accounts of respondents from the USA and the Netherlands. Further clarification of practices and research into the effect and effectiveness of the use of sedation is recommended to enhance informed reflection and policy making. (shrink)

A patient with end-stage motor neurone disease was admitted for hospice care with worsening bulbar symptoms. Although he initially walked onto the ward he became very distressed and asked for sedation. After much discussion, this man was deeply sedated, and after some harrowing days, died. Was it right to provide terminal sedation? What should the threshold be for such treatment? How should our personal reservations affect how we approach the distressed patient in an end-of-life situation?

When a severely suffering dying patient is deeply sedated, and this sedated condition is meant to continue until his death, the doctor involved often decides to abstain from artificially administering fluids. For this dual procedure almost all guidelines require that the patient should not have a life expectancy beyond a stipulated maximum of days (4–14). The reason obviously is that in case of a longer life-expectancy the patient may die from dehydration rather than from his lethal illness. But no guideline (...) tells us how we should describe the dual procedure in case of a longer life-expectancy. Many arguments have been advanced why we should not consider it to be a form of homicide, that is, ending the life of the patient (with or without his request). I argue that none of these arguments, taken separately or jointly, is persuasive. When a commission, even one that is not itself life-shortening, foreseeably renders a person unable to undo the life-shortening effects of another, simultaneous omission, the commission and the omission together should be acknowledged to kill her. I discuss the legal and ethical implications of this conclusion. (shrink)