When the original Dutch version of this book was presented in 1971 to the University of Leiden as a thesis for the Doctorate in philosophy, I was prevented by the academic mores of that university from expressing my sincere thanks to three members of the Philosophical Faculty for their support of and interest in my pursuits. I take the liberty of doing so now, two and a half years later. First and foremost I want to thank Professor G. Nuchelmans warmly (...) for his expert guidance of my research. A number of my most im portant sources were brought to my attention by him. During the whole process of composing this book his criticism and encouragement were carried out in a truly academic spirit. He thereby provided working conditions that are a sine qua non for every author who is attempting to approach controversial matters in a scientific manner, conditions which, however, were not easily available at that time. In a later phase I also came into contact with Professors L. M. de Rijk and J. B. Ubbink, with both of whom I had highly stimulating discussions and exchanges of ideas. The present edition contains some entirely new sections, viz. 1-9, IV-29, V-9, V-20, VII-14 (iii), (iv), VII-17 (i), VIII-22, IX-17, IX-19, X-9 and XI-8. Section X-9 was inspired by a remark made by Professor A. (shrink)

Bissell offers a new interpretation and clarification of Rand's definition of art, maintaining that an artwork, like language, functions as a "tool of cognition," and that it does so more specifically as a special kind of microcosm which presents an imaginary world. In particular, he argues that architecture and music are aesthetic microcosms and tools of cognition that re-create reality and embody fundamental abstractions and, thus, contrary to assertions by certain Objectivist writers, are forms of art consistent with Rand's definition (...) and concept. (shrink)

Theory of judgment is a significant problem in contemporary philosophy. Epistemology, logic, semantics and cognitive psychology are important philosophical areas which deal with different faces of the theory of judgment. One of the greatest problems in contemporary Kant Studies concerns Kant’s theory of judgment. Until 1970, an accepted reading of Kant’s theory of judgment was widespread among Kant’s English-speaking interpreters. Since 1970, some scholars began to understand and interpret Kant’s theory of judgment in a different way. This shift has led (...) to huge and wide interpretive-philosophical discussions among Kant’s scholars. According to some scholars, traces of two different theories of judgment are found in Kant’s works: explicit theory of judgment and implicit theory of judgment. In this paper, considering interpretive viewpoints of some of Kant scholars, we contrast these two theories of predication and explicate their differences. Our conclusion is that Kant’s implicit or hidden theory of judgment is more consistent with Kant’s works and philosophical views. Moreover, one of the main implications of implicit theory of judgment is that we must interpret Chapter of Schematism and logico-semantic structure of a priori synthetic judgments in a different way. (shrink)

C. S. Peirce introduced the term “icon” for sign-vehicles that signify their objects in virtue of some shared quality. This qualitative kinship, however, threatens to collapse the relata of the sign into one and the same thing. Accordingly, the late medieval philosopher of signs John Poinsot held that, “no matter how perfect, a concept [...] always retains a distinction, therefore, between the thing signified and itself signifying.” Poinsot is touted by his present-day advocates as a realist, but I believe that, (...) judged by realist standards, his requirement of minimal dissimilarity backfires. Poinsot thinks that, in analyzing the sign, we should stop before a full merger between sign-vehicle and object is reached. Peirce, by contrast, saw good reason to push the analysis all the way down to one isolated quality. Because such a qualitative merger can lend support to realism, I favour Peirce’s stance. (shrink)