Switch to: References

Citations of:

A Puzzle about Disagreement

Disputatio 5 (37):283-297 (2013)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2):183-200.
    It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Pierre’s rational and public beliefs.Victor Verdejo - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):451-469.
    Paradigmatic cases of disagreement seem not to be compatible with a widespread kind of solution to Kripke’s celebrated Pierre puzzle. As a result, the classical puzzle about rational belief is shown to be also a puzzle about public disagreement/agreement phenomena. In this paper, I defend that the new public version of the puzzle is substantial and challenging and conclude that a full solution to Kripke’s considerations must offer a satisfactory account of both the rational and public character of belief attributions. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark