When reading contemporary theories of distributive justice, one could easily get the impression that questions of fiscal design are normatively speaking merely instrumental for realizing the distributive ideal. Once the overall conception of justice is settled upon, questions of how the state should arrange its institutions and policies are settled if they effectively and efficiently promote the preferred distribution. I argue that such pure instrumentalism is mistaken in the context of fiscal policy. As a result, there is nothing problematic or (...) morally arbitrary about accepting domain-specific principles of fiscal justice. (shrink)

A growing number of professional associations and occupational groups are creating codes of ethics with the goal of guiding their members, protecting service users, and safeguarding the reputation of the profession. There is a great deal of literature dealing with the question to what extent ethical codes can achieve their desired objectives. The present paper does not contribute to this debate. Its aim is rather to investigate how rational it is to comply with codes of conduct. It is natural and (...) virtually inevitable for a reflective person to ask why one should pay any attention to ethical codes, in particular if following a code is not in one’s own interest. In order to achieve the aim of this paper, I shall (in “Quasi-reasons for complying with an ethical code” section) discuss reasons that only appear to be reasons for complying with a code. In “Code-independent reasons” section, I shall present genuine practical reasons that, however, turn out to be reasons of the wrong kind. In “Code-dependent reasons” section finally presents the most important reasons for complying with ethical codes. The paper argues that while ethical codes do not necessarily yield reasons for action, professionals can have genuine reasons for complying with a code, which may, however, be rather weak and easily overridden by reasons for deviating from the code. (shrink)

In this essay, I review some results that suggest that rational choice theory has interesting things to say about the virtues. In particular, I argue that rational choice theory can show, first, the role of certain virtues in a game-theoretic analysis of norms. Secondly, that it is useful in the characterization of these virtues. Finally, I discuss how rational choice theory can be brought to bear upon the justification of these virtues by showing how they contribute to a flourishing life. (...) I do this by discussing one particular example of a norm - the requirement that agents to honor their promises of mutual assistance - and one particular virtue, trustworthiness. (shrink)

Suppose you intend now to φ at some future time t. However, when t has come you do not φ. Something has gone wrong. This failing is not just a causal but also a normative failing. This raises the question how to characterize this failing. I discuss three alternative views. On the first view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy only if the balance of reasons pointed to φ-ing. The fact that you intended (...) to φ does not add to the reasons for φ-ing at t. On the second view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy because you violate a requirement of rationality. Both these views have in common that they deny that intending to φ at t creates a reason to φ at t. The third alternative, the one I defend, claims that you often create reasons to φ by intending to φ. (shrink)