Standard accounts of democratic disenfranchisement either start from a presumption of universal inclusion and justify electoral exclusions as deviations from the norm, or attempt to draw a demarcation line between justifiable inclusion and exclusion relying on membership in the political community. Even when successfully employed, each strategy only provides a partial view of disenfranchisement, which is usually targeted at just one or two groups of agents. In this article, I develop a generally applicable account of disenfranchisement, grounded in a respect-based (...) understanding of the relational value of democracy. This account simultaneously provides the normative basis for widespread enfranchisement under equal terms and for justified electoral exclusions. (shrink)

The idea that animals should have the right to vote sounds preposterous. Accordingly, most authors who have touched on the issue dismiss it in few words as obvi.

The commons is frequently taken to be a model of democracy. Yet, the problems of overuse and enclosure that plague common-pool resources suggest that democratic norms of inclusion, equality, and pluralism may not be realized in practice. Existing contractarian accounts of the democratic value of the commons tend to assume equality of power and clear boundaries between users and non-users. Alternative accounts that emphasize practices of commoning assume a shared social identity that appears incompatible with pluralism. These accounts provide little (...) insight into how common-pool resource regimes marked by inequalities of power might be democratized for the long-term. In contrast, I argue that the idea of treaty can serve as the basis for a democratic theory of the commons that justifies exclusion of those who would oppress marginalized groups, facilitates polycentric governance, and creates opportunities for deliberation and contestation. I illustrate the argument with reference to disputes over fisheries between the Mi’kmaq, non-Indigenous peoples, and the Canadian state. (shrink)

The prevailing view is that democratic procedures are unable to confer democratic legitimacy to decisions about democratic procedures. This paper examines this claim in detail and uses referendums on the inclusion of previously disenfranchised groups in the demos as a running example. The paper distinguishes between pure, imperfect and quasi-pure models of procedural democratic legitimacy and sub-versions of them. To various extents, each model does have the capacity to confer legitimacy to demos decisions under well-defined circumstances. The paper argues that (...) quasi-pure procedural legitimacy represents the most promising account of democratic legitimacy in cases where democratic procedures are the subject of collective decision-making. According to this model, the decision to revise the rules for membership in the demos is permissible by democratic standards if and only if the revision is not forbidden by democratic principles for inclusion. The point is that the range of alternatives that are not forbidden by democratic principles of inclusion are likely to be considerable due to vagueness of the principles themselves and/or them being subject to reasonable disagreement. The paper concludes with a discussion about the possibility of democratic legitimacy for democratic institutions not introduced as a result of democratic decision-making. (shrink)