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The Philosopher’s Interest

Ancient Philosophy 12 (2):331-349 (1992)

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  1. Administrative Lies and Philosopher-Kings.David Simpson - 1996 - Philosophical Inquiry 18 (3-4):45-65.
    The question of whether lies by those who govern are acceptable receives a clear focus and an ideal case in the Republic. Against C. D. C. Reeve, and T. C. Brickhouse and N. D Smith, I argue that the Republic’s apparent recommendation of administrative lies is incoherent. While lies may be a necessary part of the City’s administration, the process and practice of lying undermines that nature which is necessary for any suitable ruler – rendering the ideal impossible. I argue (...)
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  • Glaucon's Question Ignored: Republic 519a-521b.James Butler - 2018 - AKROPOLIS: Journal of Hellenic Studies 2:46-66.
    At Republic 519a-521b, Socrates claims that each guardian must return from his/her contemplation to run Kallipolis. Quite reasonably, Glaucon objects that they would be making the guardian's life worse than it could be. This is sometimes referred to as “the happy philosopher problem”. But rather than answering Glaucon, Socrates admonishes him that their focus is instead on the role of the class of guardians and the happiness of the whole city. It turns out this admonition is the last in a (...)
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  • Colloquium 3: The Unjust Philosophers of Republic VII.Roslyn Weiss - 2012 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 27 (1):65-103.
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  • The Last Temptation of the Philosopher-Rulers.Cathal Woods - 2009 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 3 (1).
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  • As Happy As Can Be: How Republic's Philosophers Fare Best by Ruling.Cathal Woods - 2010 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 4 (1).
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  • Plato on the Rule of Reason.Fred D. Miller - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (S1):50-83.
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  • How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism.Jyl Gentzler - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):39-67.
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  • Colloquium 6: Goat-Stags, Philosopher-Kings, and Eudaimonism in the Republic.C. D. C. Reeve - 2007 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 22 (1):185-219.
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  • “Standing Apart in the Shelter of the City Wall”: The Contemplative Ideal Vs. The Politically Engaged Philosopher in Plato's Political Theory.Catherine McKeen - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):197-216.
    Natural philosophers seem to have good reasons to prefer that the kallipolis, the maximally just community of the Republic, is never realized. If such a community is realized, philosophers are under the obligation of a just demand that they govern. However, a life that contains governance as a significant part is not the happiest life a philosopher can live. The happiest life for a philosopher is one consisting entirely or largely in philosophical contemplation. I confront this puzzle by arguing that (...)
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  • How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism.Jyl Gentzler - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):39-67.
    There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism—a view that I call ‘Simple-Minded Rational Egoism'—is neither plausible (...)
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