O artigo examina a afirmação, feita por Heidegger em Ser e tempo, segundo a qual o nascimento de um existente humano é um outro fim para o Dasein. A afirmação é analisada a partir do conceito de possibilidade existencial. Assim como a morte é interpretada existencialmente, também o nascimento ganha uma análise em termos de possibilidade. Na medida em que a possibilidade existencial é definida pela instauração de ser, e a finitude do ser-para-a-morte qualifica a morte existencial como um fim (...) , o mesmo pode ser dito do nascimento. Ou seja, o nascimento é um fim, no sentido de que determina a qualificação finita do estar em possibilidades. Natalidade e mortalidade não são apenas características de um ente vivo, mas qualificações superiores da possibilidade existencial.The paper examines Heidegger's statement in Being and Time, according to with the birth of a human existent is another end to Dasein. The statement should be analized through the concept of possibility. In the same way that death is existential interpretaded, so becomes birth an analysis by the notion of possibility. In the extent that existential possibility is definid by instauration of being, and the finitude of Sein-zum-Tode qualifies existential death as an end , the same can also be held of birth. That is, birth is an end in the sense of the finite qualifying of being thrown into possibilities. Natality and mortality are not only marks of a living being, but higher qualifications of existential possibility. (shrink)

This is a partial phenomenological study of a phenomenon that I call “displaced feeling”, which is best illustrated through a concrete example. I am overcome by a strong desire to stop writing. For one reason or another, I reject the possibility of pursuing this desire. Instead of giving up the desire altogether, however, I may “speak to myself” as follows: “I feel like having a coffee” and, the chatter goes on in the background “of course to make coffee means to (...) stop writing”. I endorse the desire to get a cup of coffee. But the action through which I pursue this desire is coloured not by the feeling that anticipates the value associated with drinking coffee but by a feeling that anticipates the value associated with stopping writing. The latter feeling has displaced the former: I am in a state of displaced feeling. Here, I will elucidate two invariant structures of displaced feeling. First, I will show that displaced feeling involves the realisation of an endorsed state of affairs, the bringing about of a rejected state of affairs, and the belief that the former will determine the latter. Next, I will show that the endorsed state of affairs appears prominently as the end of an intention, that the rejected state of affairs appears inconspicuously in the horizon of the same intention, and that the belief appears twice: as a motive for this intention and as the “glue” that keeps its prominent and inconspicuous zones together. (shrink)

En el siguiente trabajo realizaremos una clarificación de la influencia heideggeriana en la obra de Byung Chul Han, en especial, a partir de la distinción de continuidades y diferencias con la concepción de las cosas, los útiles y los entes intramundanos en tres momentos fundamentales de la obra de Heidegger, tanto en la época de _ Sein und Zeit _ como en dos trabajos de la _ Kehre _. A partir de un recorrido y análisis de las elaboraciones principales en (...) dichos trabajos nos proponemos cotejar el alcance de las lecturas críticas e interpretaciones respectivas que presenta Han en diversos ensayos relacionados con su trabajo _ No-cosas _. Por medio de ello buscaremos circunscribir los marcos comprensivos y conceptuales desde los cuales ambos pensadores conciben y tematizan las relaciones existenciales con las cosas, el entorno y el mundo, lo cual implica una concepción determinada de nuestros modos históricos-sociales de habitar el mundo. (shrink)

Evidence is the very core of Husserlian phenomenology, with the term “evidence” signifying for Husserl the phenomenological perspective on the question of truth. In contrast to the conventional philosophical understanding of “truth” in mainly epistemological terms, Husserl’s notion of “evidence”, as elaborated in his Logical Investigations (1900–1), is more essentially ontological, pointing to the way in which a phenomenon becomes clear to us in its constitution. Husserl’s main point in the Sixth Investigation was that we can “see” how evidence functions (...) when we compare something in the fullness of its presence with the emptiness of its absence. This paper considers the example Husserl offers of the room where the lights go off in order to illuminate the breakthrough for phenomenology achieved by Logical Investigations in its move beyond logic and epistemology to the primary level of pretheoretical experience as the reality of the real. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 6, Edition 2 August 2006. (shrink)

En el siguiente trabajo realizaremos una clarificación de la influencia heideggeriana en la obra de Byung Chul Han, en especial, a partir de la distinción de continuidades y diferencias con la concepción de las cosas, los útiles y los entes intramundanos en tres momentos fundamentales de la obra de Heidegger, tanto en la época de _ Sein und Zeit _ como en dos trabajos de la _ Kehre _. A partir de un recorrido y análisis de las elaboraciones principales en (...) dichos trabajos nos proponemos cotejar el alcance de las lecturas críticas e interpretaciones respectivas que presenta Han en diversos ensayos relacionados con su trabajo _ No-cosas _. Por medio de ello buscaremos circunscribir los marcos comprensivos y conceptuales desde los cuales ambos pensadores conciben y tematizan las relaciones existenciales con las cosas, el entorno y el mundo, lo cual implica una concepción determinada de nuestros modos históricos-sociales de habitar el mundo. (shrink)