Says-based definitions of lying require a notion of what is said. I argue that a conventions-based notion of utterance content inspired by Korta and Perry’s (in: Tsohatzidis (ed), John Searle's philosophy of language: Force, meaning, and thought, Cambridge University Press, 2007a) _locutionary content_ and Devitt’s (Overlooking conventions. The trouble with linguistic pragmatism, Springer, 2021) _what is said_ meets the desiderata for that theoretical role. In Sect. 1 I recall two received says-based definitions of lying and the notions of what is (...) said that have been proposed for them. In Sect. 2 I recall the desiderata that a notion of content must fulfil in order to cover the role of what is said in says-based definitions of lying. In Sect. 3 I discuss the points that Korta and Perry’s _locutionary content_ and Devitt’s _what is said_ have in common with respect to the centrality that linguistic conventions have for the constitution of utterance contents. In Sect. 4 I argue that a conventions-based notion of utterance content meets the desiderata for the role of what is said in says-based definitions of lying and has some important advantages over the notions of what is said that have been so far proposed. In Sect. 5 I point out the impact that the debate over the definition of lying has on the semantics/pragmatics divide in philosophy of language. (shrink)