Social systems theory has been dominated in recent years by the work of Niklas Luhmann, but there is another strand of systems thinking, which is receiving increasing attention in sociology: emergentism. For emergentism, the core problems of systems thinking are concerned with causation and reductionism; for Luhmann, they are questions of meaning and self-reference. Arguing from an emergentist perspective, the article finds that emergentism addresses its own core problem successfully, while Luhmann's approach is incapable of resolving questions of causation and (...) reductionism. On the other hand, neither paradigm yet has a convincing response to the challenges of meaning and self-reference. Key Words: social systems • emergence • paradigms • autopoiesis • critical realism. (shrink)

It is well known that Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems is grounded in Spencer-Brown’s seminal Laws of Form (LoF) or ‘calculus of indications’. It is also known that the reception of the latter has been rather problematic. This article attempts to describe the construction of LoF, and confront it with Niklas Luhmann’s ontological and epistemological premises. I show how LoF must be considered a protologic, or research into the fundamentals of logical systems. The clue to its understanding is to (...) be found in its profoundly topological conception of common mathematics and (Boolean) algebra. Both are explained as direct offspring of their planar orientation. Self-reference is a justified instance of an extended, more intricate topological arrangement. Its consequences for ontology (non-identity) and epistemology (autology), I argue, have been adopted correctly by Niklas Luhmann. Separate sections are devoted to how Spencer-Brown’s notion of re-entry relates to Luhmann’s definition of system/environment, and to a comparison between Luhmann’s and Parsons’ functionalism. (shrink)

The great German theorist Niklas Luhmann argued long ago that meaning is the central construct of sociology. We agree, but our scheme of stochastic processes—evolved over many years as identity and control—argues for switchings of intercalated bits of social network and interpretive domain as the core of meaning processes. We thus challenge Luhmann's central claim that modern society's subsystems are based on communicative self-closure. We assert that there is refuting evidence from sociolinguistics, from how languages are put together and how (...) languages' indexical and reflexive devices are used in social action. Communication is about managing indexicalities, which entail great ambiguity and openness as they are anchored in myriad netdom switchings across social times and spreads. In contrast, Luhmann's concept of communication revolves around binary codes governed recursively and algorithmically within systems in efforts to reduce complexity from the environment. We conclude that systems closure does not solve the problem of uncertainty in social life. In fact, lack of uncertainty is itself a problem. Order is necessary, but order at the edge of chaos. (shrink)