I develop a positive interpretation of Democritus' theory of agency and responsibility, building on previous studies that have already gone far in demonstrating his innovativeness and importance to the history and philosophy of these concepts. The interpretation will be defended by a synthesis of several familiar ethical fragments and maxims presented in the framework of an ancient problem that, unlike the problem of free will and determinism, Democritus almost certainly did confront: the problem of the causes of human goodness and (...) success. I will argue that Democritus' account of the virtues and success is naturally interpreted as an intellectualist one. His focus on our intellectual powers as the source of our own agency and cause of our success led him to remarkable breakthroughs in moral psychology, including the development of a kind of cognitive-behavioral therapy for stress and anxiety, and the proposal of an autonomous source of moral sanction. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to outline an interpretation of the philosophical understanding of the concept of the good in pre-Platonic thought. The interpretation is based on those fragments only in which the concept actually appears. As a result of the adopted assumption, the ideas of the first philosophers, i.e. Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, were outside the scope of the investigation, as well as those of Xenophanes, Eleatics, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Leucippus. In the case of the first philosophical systems (...) of the pre-Platonic philosophy one notices a connection between the good and the One. It can also be found that understanding of the ‘the Best’ is depended on, and results from, ‘the good’. This is true also in Heraclitus, though, at the same time, he introduces an significant reversal in this respect, for he abolishes the absolute difference between the good and evil, and turns it to a subjective relation. The good has no ontological basis in the Democritus’ system as well, though the good’s connection with truth, accessible for every human being, allows to interpret him as arguing for an objectivistic conception of the good. The objectivity of good has subsequently been denied by the Sophists. (shrink)

A number of Democritean fragments may loosely be called ‘political’, concerned as they are with questions to do with the πλις – with government, with the duties and dangers of public office, with justice, law and order. The majority of them have been preserved in chapters of Stobaeus’ anthology entitled ‘On the State’ , ‘On Laws and Customs’ , ‘On Government’.

This catalogue is divided into two parts. Part 1 presents basic bibliographical information on books and journal issues that consist exclusively or in large part in papers devoted to the Presocratics and the Sophists. Part 2 lists the papers on Presocratic and Sophistic topics found in the volumes, providing name of author, title, and page numbers, and in the case of reprinted papers, the year of original publication. In some cases Part 2 lists the complete contents of volumes, not only (...) the Presocratic and Sophistic-related papers. Annual updates are submitted as additional files below. (shrink)

This paper analyses chapter 58 of Theophrastus’ De sensibus, where Democritus’ account of phronein is famously presented. Democritus traces phronein to symmetria of the soul, that is conceived, in turn, as a state of thermic equilibrium, depending on his consideration of psyche as an aggregate of spherical and thin atoms flowing throughout the body and giving it life, movement, and perception. As a consequence, according to him, psychic states go hand in hand with changes in the body. In the following (...) section of this paper, I offer additional evidence in favor of the controversial manuscript reading μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν. As a result, a consistent theory by Democritus can be reconstructed, according to which the balanced state of mobility and temperature of the psychic atoms concentrated in the head that generates a correct thinking necessarily follows the movement of sensible eidola throughout the body. In fact, a number of passages from Hippocratic writings attest that Democritus shared the key features of this explanation with the physiological and medical approach of the time. (shrink)

James Warren a rappelé il y a quelques années que l’« ataraxie » n’est pas seulement un concept épicurien. L’« arrière-plan philosophique », la « tradition philosophique » qui précède Épicure remonte, a-t-il montré, à Démocrite, et a mené d’un côté à l’« ataraxie » pyrrhonienne (dès Timon) et de l’autre à l’« ataraxie » épicurienne, selon une double généalogie dont il a reconstitué dans son livre les principaux maillons. Les témoignages sur l’éthique démocritéenne sont si controversés qu’une...

Abstract: This article presents a strategy for introducing Presocratic thought to students in a manner that is both engaging and relevant. The first section addresses students' reactions to the claim that the Presocratics were the first philosophers. The second section considers how the fragmentary state of Presocratic thought does not hinder its comprehension. The third section proposes a classroom exercise for testing the scientific merits of each of the Presocratic theories. The final section proposes the use of a mock trial (...) as a means of applying the materialist approach introduced by the Presocratics to contemporary debates about free will and determinism. (shrink)

In this article, I analyze the role of Heracles' famous body in the representation of madness and its aftermath in Euripides' Heracles. Unlike studies of Trachiniae, interpretations of Heracles have neglected the hero's body in Euripides. This reading examines the eruption of that body midway through the tragedy as a part of Heracles that is daemonic and strange, but also integral to his identity. Central to my reading is the figure of the symptom, through which madness materializes onstage. Symptoms were (...) contested sites of interpretation in the late fifth century, supporting both conventional narratives about human suffering and new stories advanced by contemporary medicine and ethics. In exploring the imaginative possibilities of these new stories, I do not privilege a “secular” over a “divine” reading. Rather I aim to offer a model of interaction between medicine and tragedy that sees the cross-breeding of worldviews as productive of innovative drama. (shrink)

According to Democritus' anthropogeny is a microcosmic consequence within the process of cosmogony. However, the case of man is a peculiarity: man, this atom complex, is well aware of himself, yet is not aware of what he must do. Man does not naturally do that which promotes the harmonious ordering of his atoms. We must create a second nature. Now it becomes possible for us to be as we must be according to our first nature. Democritus is the is first (...) thinker who explains to us what our nature is and who, from our being, derives an ought: he who wishes to do the right thing for both himself and others finds himself subject to the ought requirement to do that which brings the most calm to the atoms. This is a direct connection between being and ought, an extravagant mechanical existentialism. (shrink)

I argue for the view that the scientific model which Plato consistently had in mind when sharpening his main ethical theory was medicine. Moreover, I ascribe to Plato a “medical model of ethics”. A careful examination of this model reveals how Plato appropriates several medical concepts and ideas by employing two central methodological devices in his thought: dialectical transposition and analogical characterisation. In discussing them, I identify different kinds of medical references in the dialogues –not all medical references in Plato (...) have the same methodological status– and draw greater attention to the most recurrent medical analogies in them. More generally, the paper is also meant to provide a case study of the complex relationship between medicine and philosophy in Antiquity by examining in a new light the various ways in which the former served as an epistemological and ethical model for the latter. (shrink)

Au livre XXV du Peri physeos, épicure met en œuvre une critique de Démocrite, l’accusant de s’ignorer lui-même et de soutenir une doctrine qui entre en contradiction avec ses actes. Pour Épicure, l’existence même de l’éloge et du blâme signifie que l’homme doit être considéré comme assumant, au moins partiellement, la responsabilité de son caractère acquis, de ses pensées et de ses actes. Le livre XXV du Peri physeos, pourtant, loin de prendre ses distances vis-à-vis de l’éthique de Démocrite, doit (...) être considéré comme un retour aux sources démocritéennes par Épicure et ce, par-delà les successeurs de Démocrite. L’étude des fragments et témoignages concernant Démocrite suggère en effet qu’il soutenait à la fois la thèse d’une constitution de l’âme exclusivement atomistique et la possibilité d’une transformation de l’âme par l’homme. On peut en conclure que ce n’est pas tant la perspective démocritéenne que rejette Épicure que la radicalisation déterministe effectuée par les démocritéens de la deuxième ou troisième génération. L’enjeu est donc pour Épicure, en restant fidèle à la physique et à l’éthique démocritéennes originelles, d’apporter des éléments qui permettent de justifier leur compatibilité au sein d’un même système, ce que Démocrite avait sans doute omis de faire. (shrink)

Cet article réexamine la totalité des témoignages sur la pensée démocritéenne de l’origine du culte divin. Une étude approfondie de ces témoignages nous autorise à affirmer que, dans l’esprit de Démocrite, le culte des dieux ne dérivait pas seulement d’une peur des phénomènes naturels hostiles, mais aussi de la reconnaissance pour les événements favorables à la survie des humains. Il est à présent possible de réinterpréter cette conception selon un point de vue polémique : Démocrite n’aurait pas nié l’existence des (...) dieux, mais plutôt exposé les mécanismes psychologiques qui conduisent les hommes ordinaires à croire dans les dieux traditionnels. Contre la croyance superstitieuse, il démontre, en s’aidant également de la théorie des εἴδωλα, que les seuls dieux qui existent sont pourvus de la même « raison » que celle à l’œuvre dans la nature et grâce à laquelle les hommes peuvent comprendre ses phénomènes aussi suprenants que variés. (shrink)