Метою цієї статті є доведення можливості розгляду Гайдеґерового поняття Dasein як ре- концептуалізації та модифікації Гусерлевого поняття досвіду. Предметом ана- лізу є поняття Dasein, яке є одним із найбільш проблематичних з усього Гайдеґерового спадку з огляду на його багатозначність та відповідну множинність інтерпретацій. Особливу увагу приділено дослідженню прочитання Гайдеґерової філософії як онтологічної на противагу ек- зистенціалістському та антропологічному прочитанням; авторка текстуально підтвер- джує правомірність такого прочитання та доводить, що Dasein дійсно є модифікацією Гу- сер левого поняття досвіду. Так само, вона (...) стверджує, що не лише поняття Dasein, а й сама фундаментальна онтологія може до певної міри розглядатися як ориґінальна модифікація феноменології Гусерля. Зокрема, через те, що включається у Гайдеґерів проєкт фундамен- тальної онтології та модифікується не лише одне з основних феноменологічних понять, а й метод дослідження та деякі ключові теми. (shrink)

Various scholars have argued that the rise of modern information technology over the past century has coincided with a steady decline of traditional methods of learning and interpretation, and has contributed to the general sense of “worldlessness” or anomie. In the words of Paul Ricoeur, “we are overwhelmed by a flood of words, by polemics, by the assault of the virtual, which today create a kind of opaque zone.” Philology, the ancient discipline that grew in the past two centuries to (...) encompass literary study, linguistics, and intellectual history, was originally conceived as a return to the past with the aim of retrieving the knowledge of bygone times. While the recent revival of interest in philology recognizes its importance to the humanities, it remains unnamed as such. The aim of my exploration of the history and practices of philology is to suggest how it can reinstate the presence of the past. With its attentiveness to language—undertaken in the silent spaces of private study, archive, and library—philology not only confirms the presence of the dead but also enacts a more fundamental return to “world.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn his book, Hermeneutics and Reflection, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann outlines what he sees as the fundamental differences between Edmund Husserl’s “theoretical” phenomenology and Martin Heidegger’s “a-theoretical” phenomenology, which he frames in terms of the distinction between “reflective observation” and “hermeneutic understanding”. In this paper, I will clarify the sense of these terms in order to elucidate some of the crucial similarities and differences between Husserl and Heidegger. Against von Herrmann’s characterization of the Husserlian project, I argue that we should not (...) consider these differences in terms of “reflection”, since this runs the risk of misconstruing Husserlian phenomenology with the philosophical tradition he was striving against. Taken together, by way of a close reading of von Herrmann, the following discussion will serve as a brief sketch of the early Heidegger’s turn away from Husserlian phenomenology and toward his own hermeneutic phenomenology. (shrink)

This paper exhibits a way of understanding Heidegger’s concept of being in general [Sein überhaupt] – the central aim of Being and Time’s questioning – by getting insight into his early years. I argue that the term “being” [Sein] as Heidegger understands it in the early 1920s describes the meaningful relation between humans and the things of their surrounding world which is given to us as a fact. I maintain that Sein überhaupt refers to this fact, i.e., the fact that (...) every particular being is always with a certain meaning for us. I come to this conclusion by exploring (1) Heidegger’s early analysis of Umwelterlebnis, (2) his early description of medieval transcendentia, (3) his critique of formalization and the introduction of formal indication. Lastly, (4) I observe the way Heidegger introduces the concepts of Sein and Sein überhaupt pointing to the simple fact of beings’ being in meaningful relation to us. (shrink)