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  1. Otto Neurath’s Modernist Utopianism: Linking the Vienna Circle and H. G. Wells.Ivan Ferreira da Cunha - 2024 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 14 (1):25-51.
    In this article, I discuss Otto Neurath’s philosophy in the context of Vienna Circle modernism. Following recent scholarship, the discussion considers as a starting point Neurath’s participation at the fourth International Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM IV). However, the image of Neurath’s modernism that results from this perspective is incomplete because it tends to overlook the importance of scientific utopianism in Neurath’s thought. Scientific utopianism is a methodology proposed by Neurath for the social sciences in technological contexts, in which scientists (...)
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  • Political Philosophy, Political Theory, and the Analytic-Continental Divide: A Critical Notice by Andreas Vrahimis of: Across the Great Divide: Between Analytic and Continental Political Theory, by Jeremy Arnold, Stanford University Press, 2020, 232 pp., $29.52 (paperback), ISBN 9781503612150. [REVIEW]Andreas Vrahimis - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (1):86-101.
    In the context of discussing the purported divide between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ political philosophy, Chin and Thomassen diagnose a tendency to unreflectively take the divide’s existe...
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  • Unresolvable disagreements in Carnap’s metametaphysics.Andreas Vrahimis - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (2):234-254.
    Carnap’s 1931 attack against metaphysics notoriously utilises Heidegger’s work to exemplify the meaninglessness of metaphysical pseudo‐statements. This paper interprets Carnap’s metametaphysics as concerned with delimiting theoretical dialogue in such a manner as to exclude unresolvable disagreements. It puts forth a revised version of Carnap’s argument against the viability of metaphysics, by setting aside his stronger claims that rely on verificationism and focusing instead on his account of metaphysical claims as mere expressions of what he calls “Lebensgefühl,” or a general attitude (...)
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