Controversial cases in medical ethics are, by their very nature, divisive. There are disagreements that revolve around questions of fact or of value. Ethical debate may help in resolving those disagreements. However, sometimes in such cases, there are opposing reasonable views arising from deep-seated differences in ethical values. It is unclear that agreement and consensus will ever be possible. In this paper, we discuss the recent controversial case of Vincent Lambert, a French man, diagnosed with a vegetative state, for whom (...) there were multiple court hearings over a number of years. Both family and health professionals were divided about whether artificial nutrition and hydration should be withdrawn and Lambert allowed to die. We apply a ‘dissensus’ approach to his case and argue that the ethical issue most in need of scrutiny is different from the one that was the focus of attention. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore three separate questions that are relevant to assessing the prudential value of life in infants with severe life-limiting illness. First, what is the value or disvalue of a short life? Is it in the interests of a child to save her life if she will nevertheless die in infancy or very early childhood? Second, how does profound cognitive impairment affect the balance of positives and negatives in a child’s future life? Third, if the life of (...) a child with life-limiting illness is prolonged, how much suffering will she experience and can any of it be alleviated? Is there a risk that negative experiences for such a child will remain despite the provision of palliative care? We argue that both the subjective and objective components of well-being for children could be greatly reduced if they are anticipated to have a short life that is affected by profound cognitive impairment. This does not mean that their overall well-being will be negative, but rather that there may be a higher risk of negative overall well-being if they are expected to experience pain, discomfort, or distress. Furthermore, we point to some of the practical limitations of therapies aimed at relieving suffering, such that there is a risk that suffering will go partially or completely unrelieved. Taken together, these considerations imply that some life-prolonging treatments are not in the best interests of infants with severe life-limiting illness. (shrink)

BackgroundIn the ruling inY[2018], the UK Supreme Court has confirmed that there is no general requirement for the courts in England and Wales to authorise the withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration from patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness. The perceived requirement, which originated in a court ruling in 1993, encompassed those in the vegetative state and those in the minimally conscious state. The ruling inYconfirms that the court may still be approached to decide difficult or contested cases, but (...) there is otherwise no routine requirement that the judges be approached.Main bodyThere is much to welcome in this ruling, particularly as it means that these decisions for these patients are no longer (unusually) singled out for a judicial decision, with all the financial and emotional costs that court proceedings can entail. However, there is also a risk that the ruling might have unwelcome consequences. First, there is the possibility that patients might die too soon, particularly if doctors should now adopt the courts’ previous reasoning, which has suggested that patients in the vegetative state lack interests, so treatment may – perhaps must – be withdrawn. Secondly, there is the converse possibility that patients might live too long, since empirical research suggests that – whether intentionally or not – patients’ families, clinicians, and the health system appear to promote treatment-by-default.ConclusionRather than adopt general positions, which may be contestable and potentially risky, this article argues, on a pluralistic basis, that the individual patient should be the focus of any decision made in his or her ‘best interests’. The existing legal framework in England and Wales, which is provided by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, already points in this direction, although more efforts may be needed to ensure that those involved in making these decisions are suitably educated and supported. Fortunately, new guidance from the British Medical Association could help clinicians and families to make decisions in the future, which are appropriate for the incapacitated individual patient in question. (shrink)

BackgroundPrognostic uncertainty is a challenge for physicians in the neuro intensive care field. Questions about whether continued life-sustaining treatment is in a patient’s best interests arise in different phases after a severe traumatic brain injury. In-depth information about how physicians deal with ethical issues in different contexts is lacking. The purpose of this study was to seek insight into clinicians’ strategies concerning unresolved prognostic uncertainty and their ethical reasoning on the issue of limitation of life-sustaining treatment in patients with minimal (...) or no signs of neurological improvement after severe traumatic brain injury in the later trauma hospital phase.MethodsInterviews with 18 physicians working in a neurointensive care unit in a large Norwegian trauma hospital, followed by a qualitative thematic analysis focused on physicians’ strategies related to treatment-limiting decision-making.ResultsA divide between proactive and wait-and-see strategies emerged. Notwithstanding the hospital’s strong team culture, inter-physician variability with regard to ethical reasoning and preferred strategies was exposed. All the physicians emphasized the importance of team—family interactions. Nevertheless, their strategies differed: (1) The proactive physicians were open to consider limitations of life-sustaining treatment when the prognosis was grim. They initiated ethical discussions, took leadership in clarification and deliberation processes regarding goals and options, saw themselves as guides for the families and believed in the necessity to prepare families for both best-case and worst-case scenarios. (2) The “wait-and-see” physicians preferred open-ended treatment (no limitations). Neurologically injured patients need time to uncover their true recovery potential, they argued. They often avoided talking to the family about dying or other worst-case scenarios during this phase.ConclusionsDepending on the individual physician in charge, ethical issues may rest unresolved or not addressed in the later trauma hospital phase. Nevertheless, team collaboration serves to mitigate inter-physician variability. There are problems and pitfalls to be aware of related to both proactive and wait-and-see approaches. The timing of best-interest discussions and treatment-limiting decisions remain challenging after severe traumatic brain injury. Routines for timely and open discussions with families about the range of ethically reasonable options need to be strengthened. (shrink)