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  1. (1 other version)Epistemology of brain death determination.Douglas N. Walton - 1981 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2 (3):259-274.
    This article assesses what standards of safety and certainty of diagnosis need to be met in the determination of brain death. Recent medical, legal, and philosophical developments on brain death are summarized. It is argued that epistemologically adequate standards require the finding of whole-brain death rather than destruction of the cortex. Because of the possibility of positive error in misdiagnosing death, a tutioristic approach of being on the safe side is advocated. Given uncertainties in diagnosis of so-called vegetative states like (...)
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  • (1 other version)Philosophy of medicine in Canada.Douglas N. Walton - 1982 - Metamedicine 3 (2):263-277.
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  • (1 other version)Philosophy of medicine in canada.Douglas N. Walton - 1982 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 3 (2):263-277.
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  • (1 other version)Epistemology of brain death determination.Douglas N. Walton - 1981 - Metamedicine 2 (3):259-274.
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  • (1 other version)Brain Death: Interrelated Medical and Social Issues Julius Korein, editor Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 315. New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1978. Pp. 454. No price given. [REVIEW]Douglas N. Walton - 1982 - Dialogue 21 (1):175-178.
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  • When caesarean section operations imposed by a court are justified.E. H. Kluge - 1988 - Journal of Medical Ethics 14 (4):206-211.
    Court-ordered caesarean sections against the explicit wishes of the pregnant woman have been criticised as violations of the woman's fundamental right to autonomy and to the inviolability of the person--particularly, so it is argued, because the fetus in utero is not yet a person. This paper examines the logic of this position and argues that once the fetus has passed a certain stage of neurological development it is a person, and that then the whole issue becomes one of balancing of (...)
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