This paper focuses on the effects of motivational biases on the way people reason and debate in everyday life. Unlike heuristics and cognitive biases, motivational biases are typically caused by the influence of a desire or an emotion on the cognitive processes involved in judgmental and inferential reasoning. In line with the ‘motivational’ account of irrationality, I argue that these biases are the cause of a number of fallacies that ordinary arguers commit unintentionally, particularly when the commitment to a given (...) viewpoint is very strong. Drawing on recent work in argumentation theory and psychology, I show that there are privileged links between specific types of biases and specific types of fallacies. This analysis provides further support to the idea that people’s tendency to arrive at desired conclusions hinges on their ability to construct plausible justifications for those conclusions. I suggest that this effort to rationalize biased views is the reason why unintentional fallacies tend to be persuasive. (shrink)

The fallacy of ignoring qualifications, or secundum quid et simpliciter, is a deceptive strategy that is pervasive in argumentative dialogues, discourses, and discussions. It consists in misrepresenting an utterance so that its meaning is broadened, narrowed, or simply modified to pursue different goals, such as drawing a specific conclusion, attacking the interlocutor, or generating humorous reactions. The “secundum quid” was described by Aristotle as an interpretative manipulative strategy, based on the contrast between the “proper” sense of a statement and its (...) meaning taken absolutely or in a certain respect. However, how can an “unqualified” statement have a proper meaning different from the qualified one, and vice versa? This “linguistic” fallacy brings to light a complex relationship between pragmatics, argumentation, and interpretation. The secundum quid is described in this paper as a manipulative argument, whose deceptive effect lies in its pragmatic dimension. This fallacy is analyzed as a strategy of decontextualization lying at the interface between pragmatics and argumentation and consisting of the unwarranted passage from an ut-terance to its semantic representation. By ignoring the available evidence and the presumptive interpretation of a statement, the speaker places it in a different context or suppresses textual and contextual evidence to infer a specific meaning different from the presumable one. (shrink)

Článek se věnuje argumentu kluzkého svahu a otázce, jak jej identifikovat a hodnotit. Argument kluzkého svahu je využíván v rámci praktického uvažování a v dialogu, svou strukturou odpovídá negativnímu argumentu z důsledku, má v zásadě defeasibilní povahu a je často účinný při snaze přenést důkazní břemeno na stranu oponenta. Hodnocení argumentu kluzkého svahu je založeno na kontextu dialogu spíše než na hodnocení jeho deduktivní či induktivní správnosti.V příspěvku jsou představeny čtyři typy argumentu. Zaprvé argument kluzkého svahu typu sorites, jehož označení (...) odkazuje k paradoxu sorites neboli paradoxu hromady. Argument kluzkého svahu typu sorites je ve své podstatě kombinací argumentu ad absurdum a sofismatu polyzeteseos. Zadruhé kauzální argument kluzkého svahu, který se zakládá na předpovědi série událostí. Tento typ argumentu je často označován jako teorie domina či dominový efekt. Nicméně, ať už jej pojmenujeme jakkoli, zásadní pro jeho identifikaci, analýzu a hodnocení je fakt, že se jedná o předpověď budoucího stavu věcí. Předpověď více či méně pravděpodobnou, zakládající se na slabých či silných předpokladech. Zatřetí precedentální argument kluzkého svahu, který se objevuje v diskuzích o možnosti změny současného pravidla či platné normy. Argumenty založené na precedentu obecně souvisí s usuzováním na základě konkrétního případu. Precedentální argument kluzkého svahu využívá podobnosti mezi případy, a je tedy založen na analogii. A posledním, čtvrtým typem argumentu kluzkého svahu, kterému se příspěvek věnuje, je tzv. plný argument kluzkého svahu či kombinovaný argument kluzkého svahu. (shrink)

According to the Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, the norms by which everyday human cognition is best evaluated are probabilistic rather than logical in character. Recently, the Bayesian paradigm has been applied to the domain of argumentation, where the fundamental norms are traditionally assumed to be logical. Here, we present a major generalisation of extant Bayesian approaches to argumentation that (i)utilizes a new class of Bayesian learning methods that are better suited to modelling dynamic and conditional inferences than (...) standard Bayesian conditionalization, (ii) is able to characterise the special value of logically valid argument schemes in uncertain reasoning contexts, (iii) greatly extends the range of inferences and argumentative phenomena that can be adequately described in a Bayesian framework, and (iv) undermines some influential theoretical motivations for dual function models of human cognition. We conclude that the probabilistic norms given by the Bayesian approach to rationality are not necessarily at odds with the norms given by classical logic. Rather, the Bayesian theory of argumentation can be seen as justifying and enriching the argumentative norms of classical logic. (shrink)

Recourse to meta-argument is an important feature of successful argument exchanges; it is where norms are made explicit or clarified, corrections are offered, and inferences are evaluated, among much else. Sadly, it is often an avenue for abuse, as the very virtues of meta-argument are turned against it. The question as to how to manage such abuses is a vexing one. Erik Krabbe proposed that one be levied a fine in cases of inappropriate meta-argumentative bids (2003). In a recent publication (...) (2022) Beth Innocenti expands on this notion of a penalty, arguing that some meta-arguments should be halted with “shouting, cussing, sarcasm, name-calling.” In this essay, we review Innocenti’s case that these confrontations and haltings improve the argumentative circumstances. We provide three reasons that this promise is not well-founded. First, that such confrontations have a significant audience problem, in that they are more likely to be interpreted as destroying the argumentative context than improving it. Second, that Innocenti’s procedural justification, that those who lose meta-discussions should pay a penalty, is not satisfied if the meta-discussion is halted. And third, there is a boundary problem for the cases, since it seems there is no principled reason to restrict halting meta-arguments just to these cases (especially if there is no meta-discussion on the matter to make the bounds explicit). Though expressions of anger can be appropriate in argument, we argue, it cannot take the place of argument. (shrink)

Argumentation schemes are forms of reasoning that are fallible but correctable within a self-correcting framework. Their use provides a basis for taking rational action or for reasonably accepting a conclusion as a tentative hypothesis, but they are not deductively valid. We argue that teleological reasoning can provide the basis for justifying the use of argument schemes both in monological and dialogical reasoning. We consider how such a teleological justification, besides being inspired by the aim of directing a bounded cognizer to (...) true belief and correct choices, needs to take into account the attitudes of dialogue partners as well as normative models of dialogue and communicative activity types, in particular social and cultural settings. (shrink)

Normative theories of argumentation tend to assume that logical and dialectical rules suffice to ensure the rationality of argumentative discourse. Yet, in everyday debates people use arguments that seem valid in light of such rules but nonetheless biased and tendentious. This article seeks to show that the rationality of argumentation can only be fully promoted if we take into account its ethical dimension. To substantiate this claim, I review some of the empirical evidence indicating that people’s inferential reasoning is systematically (...) affected by a variety of biases and heuristics. Insofar as these cognitive illusions are typically unintentional, it appears that arguers may be biased despite their well-intended efforts to follow the rules of critical argumentation. Nevertheless, I argue that people remain responsible for the rationality of their arguments, given that there are a number of measures that they can (and ought to) take to avoid such distortions. I highlight the importance of argumentational virtues and critical thinking to rational debates, and describe a set of indirect strategies of “argumentative self-control”. (shrink)

Why are some arguments fallacious? Since argumentation is an intellectual activity that can be performed better or worse, do we evaluate arguments simply in terms of their content, or does it also make sense to evaluate the arguer in light of the content put forward? From a ‘virtue’ approach, I propose understanding fallacies as having some link with intellectual vice. Drawing from recent work by Paul Grice, Linda Zagzebski, Andrew Aberdein, and Douglas Walton, this essay argues that if there is (...) some sense of argumentation where an argument is truth-propagating and not put forward in order to ‘win’, fallacies may be the vicious element in arguments that undermines, most often because the arguer’s goal is only. From this perspective, fallacies may not only be improper ‘moves’ in an argument, but may also reveal something lacking in the arguer’s intellectual character. (shrink)

An essential step to evaluating arguments is moving from the weight of individual premises to the weight of the conclusion. In order to perform this step, one must understand the relationship between the premises in the argument. In the past, analyzing premise relations in informal logic has been limited primarily to the linked-convergent distinction. This distinction has failed to resolve some of the basic problems in finding a definition because it has underestimated the degree to which premises interact with each (...) other in some complicated way. Embracing concepts from holistic epistemology, I argue that evaluating a premise involves considering a wide set of presuppositions and implications that that premise, if accepted, carries. I call this wide set the premise/world. The relationship between premises is then essentially just the relationship between these two premise/worlds. (shrink)