Hamblin distinguished between formal and descriptive dialectic. Formal normative models of deliberation dialogue have been strongly emphasized as argumentation frameworks in computer science. But making such models of deliberation applicable to real natural language examples has reached a point where the descriptive aspect needs more interdisciplinary work. The new formal and computational models of deliberation dialogue that are being built in computer science seem to be closely related to some already existing and very well established computing technologies such as problem (...) solving and decision making, but whether or how dialectical argumentation can be helpful to support these systems remains an open question. The aim of this paper is to examine some real examples of argumentation that seem to hover on the borderlines between deliberation, problem solving and decision making. (shrink)

In the literature, the pragmatic dimension of metaphors has been clearly acknowledged. Metaphors are regarded as having different possible uses, and in particular, they are commonly viewed as instruments for pursuing persuasion. However, an analysis of the specific conversational purposes that they can be aimed at achieving in a dialogue and their adequacy thereto is still missing. In this paper, we will address this issue focusing on the distinction between the explanatory and persuasive goal. The difference between explanation and persuasion (...) is often blurred and controversial from a theoretical point of view. Building on the analysis of explanation in different theories and fields of study, we show how it can be conceived as characterized by a cognitive and a pragmatic dimension, where the transference of understanding is used pragmatically for different dialogical goals. This theoretical proposal will be applied to examples drawn from the medical context, to show how a pragmatic approach to explanation can account for the complexity of the cases that can be found in actual dialogical contexts. -/- . (shrink)

The concern for the role of emotion in argumentative encounters has rested upon the concept of emotion as arguments, emotions to obtain the adherence of the audience and reflect the virtues of a good arguer. In this paper, we focus on understanding emotion and argumentation based on cognitive approaches that identify the relationship between the two elements, to propose the use of emotion regulation strategies in deliberative dialogue. Bearing in mind that the intensity of emotional responses may, in some cases, (...) hamper one’s capacity to solve problems during a practical argument, we suggest that the use of emotion regulation strategies may favor deliberative dialogue, leading to more adaptive emotional responses and, in turn, better argumentative encounters, rendering decision-making more efficient. This article conceptualizes argumentation, revealing the historical path of emotion in studies on argumentation. It presents the concepts of emotion and emotion regulation, followed by the function of emotion regulation in argumentative encounters, illustrating this in two different situations. We conclude with the contribution made by the use of strategies for emotion regulation during deliberative dialogue. (shrink)