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  1. Sex, Reasons, Pro Tanto Wronging, and the Structure of Rape Liability.Kate Greasley - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (2):159-179.
    Some recent scholarship in the philosophy of criminal law has claimed that sexual penetration ‘per se’—meaning, consensual or otherwise—is pro tanto morally wrong, or that there exist ‘general reasons’ against it. On such a view, penetrative sex is only ever at best justified wrongdoing. When paired with an influential view about the theoretical basis of the offence-defence distinction in criminal law, the apparent implication is that sexual penetration alone ought to constitute the actus reus of rape, with the question of (...)
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