While Merleau-Ponty’sPhenomenology of Perceptionrelies on the descriptive register of the body proper, his Sorbonne lectures on child psychology investigate the genesis of the experience of a body as one’s own. I demonstrate the uniqueness of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the narcissistic affect and sociality involved in this developmental process, distinguishing his account vis-à-vis Wallon’s and Lacan’s studies of the mirror stage. I conclude that in Merleau-Ponty’s account, (1) the experience of the body proper is not singular, but encompasses a range of (...) phenomenological variation; and (2) the genesis of the body proper is not confined to the mirror stage. The production of bodily boundaries is an ongoing process identified not only with its advent in childhood, but also with adult emotional life. The boundaries between inner and outer domains of perception are not merely discovered, but must be negotiated and cultivated in the intercorporeal affective dramas of adult life. (shrink)

L’histoire officielle de la discipline veut que la psychologie sociale française, née et morte aussitôt à la fin du XIXe siècle, ait connu une longue éclipse pour renaître seulement dans les années 1950 sous influence américaine. Cette disparition dans la première moitié du XXe siècle serait due à la domination de la sociologie durkheimienne qui passe pour être hostile à la psychologie. Cet article remet en cause cette vision traditionnelle. Il montre que la sociologie durkheimienne s’est elle-même définie comme une (...) psychologie collective et qu’elle a su, à partir des années 1910 environ, ouvrir un véritable dialogue avec les psychologues au sein de l’université. L’idée durkheimienne que les catégories les plus fondamentales de la pensée sont déjà des constructions sociales provoqua chez les psychologues une véritable petite révolution intellectuelle. Elle les obligea en effet à sortir du champ étroit de la psychophysiologie qu’avaient promu depuis 1870 les fondateurs tels Taine et Ribot, en réaction contre le spiritualisme. Cette nouvelle psychologie sociale a influencé la plupart des grands psychologues de l’époque (Blondel, Dumas, Janet, Meyerson, Wallon), mais le temps et les hommes lui ont manqué pour s’institutionnaliser. De fait, elle disparaît avec la mort de ses principaux artisans (Blondel et Halbwachs) et l’oubli parfois volontaire pratiqué par leurs successeurs. (shrink)

In 2022, the renowned historian Katja Guenther published “The Mirror and the Mind: A History of Self-Recognition in the Human Sciences.” Throughout the entirety of the book, Guenther meticulously t...

Resumen: Los objetivos de mi trabajo son: explorar la génesis de la función llamada “arco intencional” en la infancia, entenderla como un proceso de desarrollo paulatino y analizar los procesos intermedios que intervienen en su definición. Asimismo, intentaré demostrar que el concepto de arco intencional, aunque poco desarrollado por Merleau-Ponty, conlleva consecuencias que impregnan y sostienen gran parte de su teoría perceptual. Esclarecer la trama conceptual que lo fundamenta no sólo podrá arrojar luz sobre la génesis de la percepción en (...) su teoría, sino que también aportará herramientas valiosas para explicar los inicios de la constitución del cuerpo habitual en la niñez.: This paper aims to explore the genesis of the function called “intentional arc” during childhood, considering it as a process of gradual development and analysing the intermediate processes that collaborate in its definition. I also attempt to demonstrate that the concept of intentional arc, though scarcely developed by Merleau-Ponty, has consequences that imbue and support much of his perceptual theory. Clarifying the conceptual framework that sustains it can not only shed light on the genesis of perception in his theory, but also provides valuable tools to account for the beginning of the constitution of the habitual body in childhood. (shrink)

Until the 1970s, models of early infancy tended to depict the young child as internally preoccupied and incapable of processing visual-tactile data from the external world. Meltzoff and Moore's groundbreaking studies of neonatal imitation disprove this characterization of early life: They suggest that the infant is cognizant of its external environment and is able to control its own body. Taking up these experiments, theorists argue that neonatal imitation provides an empirical justification for the existence of an innate ability to engage (...) in social communication. Since later imitation is taken as a benchmark for self- and other-awareness, theorists claim that a proto- or primitive self must exist in the infant. This paper takes up the issue of whether or not neonatal imitation does provide us with a ground to argue against developmental accounts that consider self-awareness to be a later acquisition. I argue that the enthusiasm over neonatal imitation is premature. Psychological studies that claim to prove neonatal imitation do not provide sufficient grounds for dismissing alternate philosophical and psychological theories about the self as being a post-birth "event" rather than an intrinsic condition. Therefore, I argue that there is no compelling reason to suppose that we come to the world with a primitive sense of self- or other-awareness. (shrink)

This article is an analysis of a collection of articles published by Gilles Deleuze in 1953 under the direction of Georges Canguilhem. This collection, which has been little read and commented upon, sheds light on the intellectual trajectory of its author by underlining the theoretical hesitations that were his. I show that Deleuze then outlined an ambitious “psycho-sociological” project that he never fully realized. To do this, I reconstitute the psychological and ethological subtext of the book by following his sources; (...) I thus bring to light real theoretical positions often unnoticed in his work (in particular with respect to Henri Bergson, Jakob von Uexküll, and gestaltpsychology). I then argue that the difficulties linked to the theory of perception lead Deleuze to turn away from this project in order to devote himself to more specifically ontological problems. However, I suggest that these difficulties persist throughout Deleuze's works, where notions such as “sign” and “semiotics” both cover and avoid specifically perceptual problems. (shrink)

School is an educational institution designed to socialize future citizens that are Students, to adapt them to the Society to which they belong. But we cannot adapt without forcing. This means that all education, including School, needs authority that compels. As all authority is similar to constraint, the question we need to ask ourselves is how to educate in school in a democratic society? In other words, how can school combine constraint with the school’s goal of making learners free? The (...) democratic educational authority in school is the only one that can enable future citizens to live in a democratic society. (shrink)