The paper was intended to make a tentative point about the organizational reform and types of organization, i.e., international, national and private. The author explores in the basics of public administration and contextualizes the variables often employed critically for the discipline of public policy and administration. They would include, for instance, the democratic principles,importance of communication and negotiation, the concept of policy network, diversity, technology and ethics, which are applied and argued over the transition from 1947 GATT to a WTO (...) nauguration in 1995. The present study of organizations or their reform would assively be consulted for the national or private reform, which tends to shed a focus on the legal perspective, organizational efficiency and reform. The studies in variance with the types of organization or institutional agenda, as well as in the viewpoint of public policy and administration are generally lacking or insufficient, at least, less systemic or fragmented. While the WTO has made much accomplishment since its inception, it would equally be true that the criticism and new vision had been raised and will be likely ahead. As it is one of the most dynamic and active international organizations, the author likes to exemplify it to test a scope of policy variables as interactive with the last and extended renovation in 1987-1994, which continue to be relevant with the new agendas and vision for a better paradigm of WTO and as an international organization. The author also expects that the future research can develop a set of distinct elements in response with the types of organization and from the viewpoint of public administration. (shrink)

The search for valuable new products from among the world’s stock of natural biological resources is mostly carried out by people from wealthy countries, and mostly takes place in developing countries that lack the research capacity to profit from it. Surely, the indigenous people should receive some compensation from it. But we must build a robust defense for this intuition, rooted in the Western moral traditions that are widely accepted in wealthy countries, if we are to put it into practice (...) and enforce it. (shrink)

This article argues that teachers of environmental ethics must more aggressively entertain questions of private property in their work and in their teaching. To make this case, it first introduces the three primary positions on property: occupation arguments, labor theory of value arguments, and efficiency arguments. It then contextualizes these arguments in light of the contemporary U.S. wise-use movement, in an attempt to make sense of the concerns that motivate wise-use activists, and also to demonstrate how intrinsic value arguments miss (...) the mark. Finally, it offers some suggestions about further directions for environmental ethics, reasoning that there is a good deal of headway to be gained for environmental ethics by accepting that nature can be owned as property, but nevertheless engaging the idea of private property critically. (shrink)

Intellectual property typically involves claims of ownership of types, rather than particulars. In this article I argue that this difference in ontology makes an important moral difference. In particular I argue that there cannot be an intrinsic moral right to own intellectual property. I begin by establishing a necessary condition for the justification of intrinsic moral rights claims, which I call the Rights Justification Principle. Briefly, this holds that if we want to claim that there is an intrinsic moral right (...) to φ, we must be able to show that (a) violating this right would typically result in either a wrongful harm or other significant wrong to the holder of the right, and (b) the wrongful harm or other wrong in question is independent of the existence of the intrinsic right we are trying to justify. I then argue that merely creating a new instance of a type is not the kind of action which can wrongfully harm the creator of that type. Insofar as there do seem to be wrongs involved in copying a published poem or computer program, these wrongs presuppose the existence of an intrinsic right to own intellectual property, and so cannot be used to justify it. I conclude that there cannot be an intrinsic right to own intellectual property. (shrink)

DNA patents have been being granted since the 1970s. Patents are meant to act as incentives, encouraging innovation and dissemination in biotechnology by granting inventors exclusive economic control of their inventions for a set period of time. Governments in North America and Europe have therefore been using patents as a public policy tool to encourage the invention of health-related biotechnologies since the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. However despite this laudable policy goal, there have also in recent decades been a number (...) of controversies related to patenting in biotechnology. Commentators are concerned that patents may in fact be having a detrimental effect on innovation of and access to health-related products and processes. While empirical evidence that has been collected to date in relation to these concerns remains inconclusive, the debate may be clarified through the articulation of the rights and responsibilities that are at stake. The scope and content of a human right to healthcare are ultimately society-dependent, but its articulation can clarify whether instrumental property rights granted to inventors are interfering with this right in an unacceptable way. Intellectual property rights in health-related biotechnologies cannot be justified from a theoretical perspective, and so more definitive empirical data elucidating the role that patents play in regards to innovation and dissemination of health-related biotechnology is needed. (shrink)