Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Value of Sacrifices.Jörg Löschke - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):399-418.
    ABSTRACTMost authors who discuss the normative impact of sacrifices do so with regards to the impact that a sacrifice can have on the practical reasons of the agent who makes it. A different and underappreciated phenomenon of sacrifices is their other-regarding normative impact: the sacrifice of person A can have an impact on the practical reasons of person B, either by generating practical reasons for B to act in certain ways or by intensifying existing reasons of B for specific courses (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Reasons, Values, Valuing: Teleology and Explanation.Meredith McFadden - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):23-44.
    We interact with value in two ways: we recognize objects as valuable and we take objects up as significant for our lives by valuing them. These two modes of interaction involve different kinds of reasons. Recognizing an object as valuable involves recognizing reasons that everyone shares, but agents can differ with respect to their reasons to value the object, and the reasons which are then involved in valuing. Using this observation, I argue that our relations to value and reasons are (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Samuel Scheffler on Valuing and Considering Valuable.Jonathan Stanhope - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1609-1616.
    Consider the utterances ‘our friendship is valuable’ and ‘I value our friendship’. On the face of it, these aren’t semantic equivalents: the former ascribes a property to our friendship, whereas the latter reports something about how I relate to our friendship. In this short paper, I first outline Samuel Scheffler’s account of valuing and of the difference between valuing and considering valuable. I then propose an amendment to his account of valuing, one which concerns how we interact with our value-related (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Agent-Relative Reasons and Normative Force.Jörg Löschke - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (1):359-372.
    The distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons is philosophically important, but there is no consensus on how to understand the distinction exactly. In this paper, I discuss several interpretations of the distinction that can be found in the literature: the Motivational Interpretation, the Scope Interpretation, and the Goal Interpretation, and argue that none of these interpretations is entirely convincing. I propose a novel interpretation of the distinction, which I call the Normative Force Interpretation, according to which the distinction between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons.D. W. Portmore - 2011 - Mind 120 (477):117-153.
    It is through our actions that we affect the way the world goes. Whenever we face a choice of what to do, we also face a choice of which of various possible worlds to actualize. Moreover, whenever we act intentionally, we act with the aim of making the world go a certain way. It is only natural, then, to suppose that an agent's reasons for action are a function of her reasons for preferring some of these possible worlds to others, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - Cambridge University Press.
    Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics and action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new essays written by leading scholars define and assess this new approach in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Samuel Scheffler on Valuing and Considering Valuable.Jonathan Stanhope - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1609-1616.
    Consider the utterances ‘our friendship is valuable’ and ‘I value our friendship’. On the face of it, these aren’t semantic equivalents: the former ascribes a property to our friendship, whereas the latter reports something about how I relate to our friendship. In this short paper, I first outline Samuel Scheffler’s account of valuing and of the difference between valuing and considering valuable. I then propose an amendment to his account of valuing, one which concerns how we interact with our value-related (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Value of Caring.Jörg Löschke - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):118-126.
    This article responds to Barry Maguire's recent attempt to justify partiality within a consequentialist framework.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses.Jörg Löschke - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):477-491.
    Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any nonconsequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value responses: when an agent acts on an agent-relative reason, she responds appropriately to the agent-neutral value of her (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Value of Caring.J.Örg L.Öschke - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):118-126.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Conservative Value.Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin - 2016 - The Monist 99 (4):352-371.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • La normativité des concepts évaluatifs.Christine Tappolet - 2011 - Philosophiques 38 (1):157-176.
    On admet en général qu’il y a deux sortes de concepts normatifs : les concepts évaluatifs, comme bon, et les concepts déontiques, comme devoir. La question que soulève cette distinction est celle de savoir comment il est possible d’affirmer que les concepts évaluatifs sont normatifs. En effet, comme les concepts déontiques semblent constituer le coeur du domaine normatif, plus le fossé entre les deux sortes de concepts est grand, moins il paraîtra plausible d’affirmer que les concepts évaluatifs sont normatifs. Après (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Relationships as Indirect Intensifiers: Solving the Puzzle of Partiality.Jörg Löschke - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):390-410.
    Two intuitions are important to commonsense morality: the claim that all persons have equal moral worth and the claim that persons have associative duties. These intuitions seem to contradict each other, and there has been extensive discussion concerning their reconciliation. The most widely held view claims that associative duties arise because relationships generate moral reasons to benefit our loved ones. However, such a view cannot account for the phenomenon that some acts are supererogatory when performed on behalf of a stranger (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark