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  1. On why proximal intentions need to remain snubbed: a reply to Mele.Marcela Herdova - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (8):2025-2046.
    I argue against elements of Alfred Mele’s picture of the nature of intentions and the triggers of intentional actions. Mele (Philosophical Studies 176:2833–2853, 2019) offers rebuttals to my (Herdova, Philosophical Studies, 173(3), 573–587, 2016; Herdova, Philosophical Explorations, 21(3):364–383, 2018) and Ann Bumpus’s (2001) arguments which limit the scope of proximal intentions as triggers of intentional actions. Here I offer a response to Mele and provide further arguments in favor of my alternative understanding of intentions and the causes of intentional actions. (...)
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