Autonomy in bioethics is coming under sustained criticism from a variety of perspectives. The criticisms, which target personal or individual autonomy, are largely justified. Moral conceptions of autonomy, such as Kant’s, on the other hand, cannot simply be applied in bioethical situations without moralizing care provision and recipience. The discussion concludes with a proposal for re-thinking autonomy by focusing on what different agents count as reasons for choosing one rather than another course of action, thus recognising their involvement in the (...) decision process. (shrink)

This article questions the commonly held view that professional ethics is grounded in general ethical principles, in particular, respect for client (or patient) autonomy and beneficence in the treatment of clients (or patients). Although these are admirable as general ethical principles, we argue that there is considerable logical difficulty in applying them to the professional-client relationship. The transition from general principles to professional ethics cannot be made because the intended conclusion applies differently to each of the parties involved, whereas the (...) premise is a general principle that applies equally to both parties. It is widely accepted that professionals are required to recognize that clients or patients possess rights to autonomy that are more than the general rights to personal autonomy accepted in ordinary social life, and that professionals are expected to display beneficence toward their clients that is more than the beneficence expected of anyone in ordinary social life. The comparative component of professional ethics is an intrinsic feature of the professional situation, and thus it cannot be bypassed in working out a proper professional ethics. Thus, we contend, the proper professional treatment of clients or patients has not been explained by appeal to general ethical principles. (shrink)

The four principles approach to biomedical ethics points to respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice as the norms that should guide moral agents working in the biosciences, and particularly in health care. While the approach is well known, it is not without its critics. In this paper, which is primarily aimed at health professionals and students (from various disciplines) who are studying health care ethics, I consider four problems with the four principles, which respectively claim that the approach is (...) imperialist, inapplicable, inconsistent and inadequate. In keeping with the aims of the ‘five-minute focus’, the primary objective is to introduce these debates, rather than seek to resolve them. However, I will suggest that the approach does have its merits, not least for time-pressed clinicians who are keen to keep an eye on the ethical dimensions of their practices, and for students training in the health care professions, provided that they appreciate that the approach provides only a starting point for, and not the end point of, moral deliberation. (shrink)

Principlism appears to be the prevailing applied ethical framework in bioethics. Despite the view’s various strengths, critics point out that since the principles are ad hoc, conflicts indubitably emerge leading to inconsistency. There is debate around whether principlism can provide definitive action-guiding moral prescriptions or only help structure intelligent analyses and justifications of moral choices. In this paper, I contend that applying concepts of moral symmetry and moral asymmetry allows us to modify one of principlism’s principles—the principle of beneficence—into what (...) I will call the principle of compassion. I argue that the principle of compassion can function as an arbitrating or primary principle within the principlist framework. The result is a view we might call compassionate principlism. Arguably, compassionate principlism leads to fewer inconsistencies and provides more acceptable action-guiding moral prescriptions than traditional principlism. (shrink)

The demand for donor organs for transplantation in the UK far exceeds the supply. A number of improvements in the infrastructure surrounding organ donation, as well as attempts to increase public awareness, have been made over recent years, but there remains a massive shortfall. It has been proposed that a system of presumed consent for organ donation, in which all individuals are considered to be potential organ donors after death unless they have previously opted out, may serve to increase the (...) supply of organs. Recently the Welsh Assembly passed a Bill introducing presumed consent by 2015, but the debates regarding legislative changes are still on-going in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The ethical implications of presumed consent legislation are at the centre of these discussions. When examined by a principlist approach, presumed consent may be deemed to be an ethically beneficial measure to increase organ donation rates. It is argued here that the system of presumed consent may actually be more respectful of the principle of autonomy than a system of explicit consent, on the basis that it goes against the wishes of the fewest number of people, and it has clear benefits in terms of beneficence and justice whilst also being compatible with the principle of nonmaleficence. Although there is some debate about the precise impact that presumed consent would have on donation rates, there is evidence to suggest that it would result in an increase in the donor organ supply, when combined with improvements in education and infrastructure. (shrink)

Moral sensitivity and moral reasoning are essential competencies biomedical researchers have to develop to make ethical decisions in their daily practices. Previous research has shown that these competencies can be developed through ethics education. However, it is unclear which underlying mechanisms best support the development of these competencies. In this article we argue that the development of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning can be fostered through teaching strategies that tap into students’ moral imagination. We describe how moral imagination can stimulate (...) the development of these competencies through three different merits of moral imagination. Moral imagination can help students to 1) transfer and apply abstract moral concepts to concrete situations and contexts, 2) explore the perspective of others, 3) explore and foresee the moral consequences of different decisions and actions. We explain these three merits of moral imagination in the context of biomedical research and present a theoretical model for how these merits can be used to stimulate the development of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. Furthermore, we describe multiple teaching strategies for biomedical curricula that tap into the three merits of moral imagination. These teaching strategies can inspire teachers to design ethics education that activates students’ moral imagination for the development of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. (shrink)

For many, Thomas Beauchamp and James Childress have elaborated moral reasoning by using the four principles whereby all substantive problems of medical ethics (and of ethics more generally) can be properly analysed and cogent philosophical solutions for the problems can be found. It seems that their ‘principlism’ gets updated, with better features being added during the course of the six editions of Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Nonetheless, Beauchamp and Childress seem to have been losing their way when it comes to (...) the common-morality justification, which is the epistemological (and perhaps metaphysical) backbone of their method, and this is shown more vividly in their most recent (2009) edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics. The author points out what he calls the problem of ‘thick in status, thin in content’ in principlism. The problem exists because principlism cannot adequately explain how the prescriptive sense of common morality it supports is consistent with the existence of what Beauchamp and Childress call the ‘legitimate moral diversity in the world’. Because of this problem, first, the practical end that principlism allegedly accomplishes (ie, providing practical moral guidelines in a relatively ‘thick’ content, based on common morality) is frustrated, and, second, principlism makes itself the method of common morality de jure and of moral pluralism de facto. (shrink)

Duty of care is the core ethical responsibility of healthcare workers. Getting the workforce vaccinated will provide safety to the public, protect the vulnerable population and provide a safe working environment. While most agree that healthcare workers should be prioritised in the vaccination programme, mandatory vaccination remains a complicated and contentious issue with political, legal and ethical dimensions. This study aims to determine the ethical considerations associated with mandatory vaccinations among healthcare workers. A total of 152 abstracts were identified of (...) which, 142 were excluded based on abstracts because they did not meet the inclusion criteria. The remaining ten articles were further evaluated with three articles that fit the inclusion criteria specifically discussing mandatory vaccination among healthcare workers and the ethical issues. Benefits, risks, effectiveness, equity and justice, autonomy, reciprocity and trust were used as a framework to discuss the ethical considerations which resonated both directly from the included papers, as well as more generally from the other literature associated with this search. There is limited literature on the topic of ethical considerations associated with COVID-19 mandatory vaccination of healthcare workers, as a systematic review identified only 3 papers. Benefits, risks, effectiveness, equity and justice, autonomy, reciprocity and trust were among the seven ethical considerations identified and discussed. (shrink)

Conflict of interests in medicine are typically taken to be financial in nature: it is often assumed that a COI occurs when a healthcare practitioner’s financial interest conflicts with patients’ interests, public health interests, or professional obligations more generally. Even when non-financial COIs are acknowledged, ethical concerns are almost exclusively reserved for financial COIs. However, the notion of “interests” cannot be reduced to its financial component. Individuals in general, and medical professionals in particular, have different types of interests, many of (...) which are non-financial in nature but can still conflict with professional obligations. The debate about healthcare delivery has largely overlooked this broader notion of interests. Here, we will focus on health practitioners’ moral or religious values as particular types of personal interests involved in healthcare delivery that can generate COIs and on conscientious objection in healthcare as the expression of a particular type of COI. We argue that, in the healthcare context, the COIs generated by interests of conscience can be as ethically problematic, and therefore should be treated in the same way, as financial COIs. (shrink)