Distinguishing between normal and non-normal cases of perception and motricity is a key part of Merleau-Ponty’s methodology in Phenomenology of Perception. Many feminist philosophers and disability scholars have criticized this use of the normal/nonnormal binary and the presumptions behind it. Others have embraced his methodology and noted its consonance with contemporary feminist, disability, and philosophy of race scholarship. In this paper, I present my own interpretation of what Merleau-Ponty means by “normal”. I draw on Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s concept of “fit” and (...) also draw attention to the broader existential-phenomenological framework within which Merleau-Ponty is working. This re-framing of the term does two things. First, it provides a clear picture of the hidden methodology at work in Phenomenology of Perception. Second, it offers the possibility of grounding the concept of “fit” in an existential-phenomenological conception of the self. (shrink)