This article analyzes the relative effectiveness and limitations of companies’ voluntarily produced transparency reports in promoting change in firm and government behavior. Such reports are published by telecommunications companies and disclose how often and on what grounds government agencies compel customer data from these companies. These reports expose corporate behaviors while lifting the veil of governmental secrecy surrounding these kinds of compulsions. Fung, Graham, and Weil’s “targeted transparency” model is used to evaluate the extent to which these reports affect behavior. (...) From the analysis, it is evident that telecommunications companies’ transparency reports are only partially effective; while firms may modify their reports to present more information, these reports do not necessarily induce government to more broadly reveal its own activities. The article ultimately suggests that voluntarily produced transparency reports may become more comparable with one another as a result of either corporate reports evolving in consultation with external stakeholders or following a crisis that prompts government or industry to adopt a given standard. Such standards may positively influence the effectiveness of reports while concealing as much about firm behaviors as they purport to reveal. (shrink)

This study investigates how adoption of advisory governance policy encourages firms to become more responsive to their shareholders over time. Although shareholder activism is costly and often viewed as unable to drive meaningful change, we identify increasing shareholder voice as an underlying mechanism to explain how advisory policy adoption ultimately reshapes board–shareholder relations. Drawing on signaling theory and behavioral views of board–shareholder dynamics, we test our predictions following the broad shift in corporate board voting policies from plurality to majority vote (...) standards. While prior research shows that majority vote adoption has little to no direct impact on director elections, empirical results from 2,390 firm-year observations provide support for our hypotheses that adoption of this advisory electoral standard signals a willingness to hear shareholder concerns, leading to increased shareholder activism and, in turn, board responsiveness to shareholder proposals. Overall, our results help explain why some firms continue to fight the purely advisory policy and why an era of shareholder empowerment followed the majority vote campaign. (shrink)