An expanding policy framework aimed at monitoring alcohol consumption during pregnancy has emerged. The primary justification is prevention of harm from what is termed ‘prenatal alcohol exposure’ (PAE), by enabling more extensive diagnosis of the disability labelled fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD). Here we focus on proposals to include biomarkers as a PAE ‘screening tool’, specifically those found in meconium (the first newborn excrement), which are discussed as an ‘objective’ measure of PAE.We ask the overarching question, ‘Can routine screening of (...) meconium to establish PAE be ethically or legally justified’, and we answer, ‘No’. To reach this conclusion, we discuss three areas. First, we consider the reasons why meconium screening should not be deemed ‘typical’ within the scope of accepted screening tools. We argue that given the aim and necessary timing of the screen, it cannot achieve what it promises. Second, we outline why patient autonomy and consent are not properly accounted for and cannot be reconciled with the ‘routinisation’ of the proposed ‘screening’. Last, we outline why the benefit of such a screen is not clear, focusing on the significance of trust in healthcare professionals (HCP) for the best interests of the future child and pregnant woman.While recognising the adverse effects of heavy alcohol consumption during pregnancy, we emphasise the case for robust ethical, legal and social considerations and the central need for trust between HCP and patients in maternity care. We conclude the permissibility of meconium screening has not been proven, and it is not justified. (shrink)

Trust is taken to be one of the foundational values in the doctor-patient relationship, facilitating access to the benefits of health care and providing a guarantee against possible harms. Despite this foundational role, some doctors betray the trust of their patients. Trusting involves granting discretionary powers and makes the truster vulnerable to the trustee. Patients trust medical practitioners to act with goodwill and to act competently. Some patients carry pre-existing vulnerabilities, for reasons such as gender, poverty, age, ethnicity, or disability, (...) and these vulnerabilities can be exacerbated when such patients extend their trust to a doctor. Gender stereotypes reduce women's ability to challenge and thereby assess their doctor's competency. In addition, women are more likely to be distrusted by their doctors and have their experiences of medical symptoms discounted. In this paper, we analyze two extreme examples of breaches of medical trust that exploited the vulnerability of women in the health care system: the "unfortunate experiment" at the National Women's Hospital in New Zealand and the Harold Shipman murders of elderly patients in the United Kingdom, examining the potential role of gender in the outcomes with regard to trust. Major breaches of medical trust such as these typically lead to government inquiries, revisions of ethical guidelines, and substantive policy change in an effort to re-establish public and patient trust. We argue that the medical profession has an ethical obligation to put mechanisms in place to protect vulnerable patients from abuses of trust, to monitor colleagues' competence, and to be prepared to blow the whistle to protect patients who are not in a position to recognize misplaced trust. Such mechanisms will act disprosportionately to reduce harm to women as patients. (shrink)

Machine learning (ML) systems play an increasingly relevant role in medicine and healthcare. As their applications move ever closer to patient care and cure in clinical settings, ethical concerns about the responsibility of their use come to the fore. I analyse an aspect of responsible ML use that bears not only an ethical but also a significant epistemic dimension. I focus on ML systems’ role in mediating patient–physician relations. I thereby consider how ML systems may silence patients’ voices and relativise (...) the credibility of their opinions, which undermines their overall credibility status without valid moral and epistemic justification. More specifically, I argue that withholding credibilitydue tohow ML systems operate can be particularly harmful to patients and, apart from adverse outcomes, qualifies as a form of testimonial injustice. I make my case for testimonial injustice in medical ML by considering ML systems currently used in the USA to predict patients’ risk of misusing opioids (automated Prediction Drug Monitoring Programmes, PDMPs for short). I argue that the locus of testimonial injustice in ML-mediated medical encounters is found in the fact that these systems are treated asmarkers of trustworthinesson which patients’ credibility is assessed. I further show how ML-based PDMPs exacerbate and further propagate social inequalities at the expense of vulnerable social groups. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the process of risk communication in the context of assisted reproduction in Latvia. The paper is based on a qualitative methodology and two types of data: media analysis and 30 semi-structured interviews (11 patients, 4 egg donors, 15 experts). The study explores a broad definition of risk communication and explores three types of risks: health, psychosocial, and moral. We ask (1), who is involved in risk communication, (2), how risks are discussed using (...) different channels of communication, and (3), what ethical problems arise during this process. In the process of analysis, we identified four types of information channels and two strategies of risk communication used by patients, as well as several ethical problems. In our view, the analysis of risk communication practices is significant to improve patient/physician relationship, as well as better meet patients' needs for comprehensive risk information. (shrink)

The diagnosis of Functional Neurological Disorder (FND) requires differentiation from other neurologic diseases/syndromes, and from the comparatively rare diagnosis of feigning (Malingering and Factitious Disorder). Analyzing the process of diagnosing FND reveals a necessary element of presumption, which I propose underlies some of the uncertainty, discomfort, and stigma associated with this diagnosis. A conflict between the neurologist’s natural social cognition and professional judgement (cognitive dissonance) can be understood by applying a framework originally designed for the determination of moral responsibility. Understanding (...) the source of this cognitive dissonance may effect its alleviation, and in turn, allow more compassionate treatment of patients with FND. (shrink)

Patient’s duties are a topical but little researched area in nursing ethics. However, patient’s duties are closely connected to nursing practice in terms of autonomy, the best purpose of care and rethinking from the patient’s perspective. This article is a metasynthesis (N = 11 original articles) of patient’s duties, aimed to create a tentative model. In this article, a tentative model called ‘right-based duties of a patient’ was constructed. With its aid, a coherent structure of patient’s duties within different roles (...) and objects of a patient can be defined. In addition, the ethical basis, prerequisites, outcomes and risks of patient’s duties can be named. In conclusion, so-called right-based duties of a patient constitute the basic argument. Patient’s duties are not unambiguous for all patients, and the global perspective to duties has been challenged. However, due to both conceptual and practical reasons, rethinking of patient’s duties is needed. (shrink)

The therapeutic misconception has been seen as presenting an ethical problem because failure to distinguish the aims of research participation from those receiving ordinary treatment may seriously undermine the informed consent of research subjects. Hence, most theoretical and empirical work on the problems of the therapeutic misconception has been directed to evaluate whether, and to what degree, this confusion invalidates the consent of subjects. We argue here that this focus on the understanding component of informed consent, while important, might be (...) too narrow to capture the ethical complexity of the therapeutic misconception. We show that concerns about misplaced trust and exploitation of such trust are also relevant, and ought to be taken into account, when considering why the therapeutic misconception matters ethically. (shrink)

The question of whether a patient has insight is among the first to be considered in psychiatric contexts. There are several competing conceptions of clinical insight, which broadly refers to a patient’s awareness of their mental illness. When a patient is described as lacking insight, there are significant implications for patient care and to what extent the patient is trusted as a knower. Insight is currently viewed as a multidimensional and continuous construct, but competing conceptions of insight still lack consensus (...) on the specifics. Studies also give contradictory evidence regarding the frequency and consequences of poor insight. A number of crucial questions remain unanswered. After outlining some of the key theoretical disagreements about what insight means, I highlight ethical issues that have not received much attention in the literature. Given the conceptual ambiguities and the absence of standardised bedside tools, there are significant ethical concerns about insight assessments. I highlight two main ethical concerns, specifically that these assessments risk: marginalising patients by setting unattainable ideals for self-knowledge and minimising the patient’s own perspective on their mental health. I close with recommendations for documenting and responding to concerns about poor insight, so patients who are vulnerable to losing epistemic trust are better supported in their therapeutic relationships. (shrink)

Trust is central to the therapeutic relationship, but the epistemic asymmetries between the expert healthcare provider and the patient make the patient, the trustor, vulnerable to the provider, the trustee. The narratives of pain sufferers provide helpful insights into the experience of pain at the juncture of trust, expert knowledge, and the therapeutic relationship. While stories of pain sufferers having their testimonies dismissed are well documented, pain sufferers continue to experience their testimonies as being epistemically downgraded. This kind of epistemic (...) injustice has received limited treatment in bioethics. In this paper, we examine how a climate of distrust in pain management may facilitate what Fricker calls epistemic injustice. We critically interrogate the processes through which pain sufferers are vulnerable to specific kinds of epistemic injustice, such as testimonial injustice. We also examine how healthcare institutions and practices privilege some kinds of evidence and ways of knowing while excluding certain patient testimonies from epistemic consideration. We argue that providers ought to avoid epistemic injustice in pain management by striving toward epistemic humility. Epistemic humility, as a form of epistemic justice, may be the kind disposition required to correct the harmful prejudices that may arise through testimonial exchange in chronic pain management. (shrink)

We generally accept that medicine’s conceptual and ethical foundations are grounded in recognition of personhood. With patients in vegetative state, however, we’ve understood that the ethical implications of phenomenal consciousness are distinct from those of personhood. This suggests a need to reconsider medicine’s foundations. What is the role for recognition of consciousness (rather than personhood) in grounding the moral value of medicine and the specific demands of clinical ethics? I suggest that, according to holism, the moral value of medicine is (...) secured when conscious states are recognized in everyday medical science. Moreover, consciousness fully motivates traditional principles of clinical ethics if we understand respect for autonomy as respect for the dominion of an experiencer in the private, inescapable realm of bodily experience. When medicine’s foundations are grounded in recognition of consciousness, we understand how patients fully command respect even when they lack capacity to exercise their bodily dominion through decision-making. (shrink)