Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Reference Magnetism Does Not Exist.Jared Warren - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (7):2825-2833.
    In the last 35 years many philosophers have appealed to reference magnetism to explain how it is that we mean what we mean. The idea is that it is a constitutive principle of metasemantics that the interpretation that assigns the more natural meanings is correct, _ceteris paribus_. Among other things, magnetism has been used to answer the challenges of grue and quus, Quine’s indeterminacy of translation argument, and Putnam’s model-theoretic argument against realism. Critics of magnetism have usually objected to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Induction With and Without Natural Properties: a New Approach to the New Riddle of Induction.Paul D. Thorn & Gerhard Schurz - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-24.
    Drawing on past work, we introduce a new approach to the New Riddle of Induction, showing that the inductive projection of gruesome properties is unreliable under particular ideal conditions that are sufficient for the reliable inductive projection of non-gruesome properties. As an auxiliary to our account, we introduce rules for resolving conflicts between background information and the conclusions of otherwise reliable inductive inferences. Our approach to the New Riddle of Induction is quite permissive in the range of properties it recognizes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark