The ability to judge spatial relations from perspectives that differ from one's current body orientation and location is important for many everyday activities. Despite considerable research on imaginal perspective taking, however, detailed computational accounts of the processes involved in this ability are missing. In this contribution, I introduce Smart (Spatial Memory Access by Reference Frame SelecTion) as a computational cognitive model of imaginal perspective taking processes. In assuming that imaginal perspective taking is governed by reference frame selection for memory access (...) and subsequent motor activation, Smart is able to explain and simulate key findings on human imaginal perspective taking. In addition to providing novel insight into the mechanisms underlying imaginal perspective taking, Smart also has several implications for our view on spatial memory, more generally. In particular, Smart supports the idea that enduring spatial representations are essentially orientation-free and that spatial representations are best viewed as flexible combinations of representation structures and reference frames. (shrink)

Daily function depends on an ability to mentally map our environment. Environmental factors such as visibility and layout, and internal factors such as psychological stress, can challenge spatial memory and efficient navigation. Importantly, people vary dramatically in their ability to navigate flexibly and overcome such challenges. In this paper, we present an overview of “schema theory” and our view of its relevance to navigational memory research. We review several studies from our group and others, that integrate manipulations of environmental complexity (...) and affective state in order to gain a richer understanding of the mechanisms that underlie individual differences in navigational memory. Our most recent data explicitly link such individual differences to ideas rooted in schema theory, and we discuss the potential for this work to advance our understanding of cognitive decline with aging. The data from this body of work highlight the powerful impacts of individual cognitive traits and affective states on the way people take advantage of environmental features and adopt navigational strategies. (shrink)

Daily function depends on an ability to mentally map our environment. Environmental factors such as visibility and layout, and internal factors such as psychological stress, can challenge spatial memory and efficient navigation. Importantly, people vary dramatically in their ability to navigate flexibly and overcome such challenges. In this paper, we present an overview of “schema theory” and our view of its relevance to navigational memory research. We review several studies from our group and others, that integrate manipulations of environmental complexity (...) and affective state in order to gain a richer understanding of the mechanisms that underlie individual differences in navigational memory. Our most recent data explicitly link such individual differences to ideas rooted in schema theory, and we discuss the potential for this work to advance our understanding of cognitive decline with aging. The data from this body of work highlight the powerful impacts of individual cognitive traits and affective states on the way people take advantage of environmental features and adopt navigational strategies. (shrink)

In his novel Remembrance of Things Past, Marcel Proust argues that conventional descriptions of the phenomenology of consciousness are incomplete because they focus too much on the highly-salient sensory information that dominates each moment of awareness and ignore the network of associations that lies in the background. In this paper, I explicate Proust’s theory of conscious experience and show how it leads him directly to a theory of aesthetic perception. Proust’s division of awareness into two components roughly corresponds to William (...) James’ division of the stream of thought into a “nucleus” and “fringe.” Proust argues that the function of art is to evoke the underlying associative network indirectly in the mind of the observer by using carefully chosen sensory surfaces to control the stream of thought. I propose a possible neural basis for this Proustian/Jamesian phenomenology, and argue that the general principles of Proustian aesthetics can be applied to all forms of art. I conclude that a scientific theory of art should follow in a straightforward manner from a scientific theory of consciousness. (shrink)