Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi regard the human as an emotional being and especially consider such moral feelings as humane love, filial piety and devoted loyalty to be the constituent elements of humanity. On the one hand, they try to integrate the corresponding multiple roles of the humane person, filial son and loyal subject in harmony in order to make one become a true human in the ethical sense; on the other hand, they assign a supreme position merely to filial piety (...) or loyalty in cases of conflict because they regard one's parents or ruler as the greatest root of one's life, respectively. As a result, their ideas about humanity fall into some in-depth moral paradoxes, which might be resolved by a post-Confucian transformation of the traditional Confucian framework from particularistic consanguinism to universalistic humanism. (shrink)

In the Confucian tradition, the ideal government is called "benevolent government" (ren zheng), central to which is the ruler's parental love toward his people who he deems as his children. Hanfeizi criticized this seemingly innocent political idea by pointing out that (1) not only is the state not a family but even within the family parental love is short of making the children orderly and (2) ren as love inevitably results in the ruin of the state because it confuses what (...) is right/meritorious with what is not, thus disrupts the legal system. In this paper, I defend Confucian virtue politics against Hanfeizi's criticisms. I argue that by failing to grasp the complex nature of ren that encompasses both emotion (ren as love) and moral virtue (ren as filiality), Hanfeizi also failed to understand the actual process in which the ruler's parental love is extended to the people. (shrink)

Argues that throughout the classical period in China, the word `fa' consistently means measurable, publicly accessible standards for the application of terms used in behavioral guidance. Review of the Daoist analysis of the meaning of fa; Original philosophical role of fa; Detail of Chinese philosopher Han Feizi's theories on the legal use of the term `fa.'.

Writing only decades apart, Han Feizi (ca. 250 BCE) and Kautilya (ca. 300 BCE) were two great political thinkers who argued for strong leaders, king or emperor, to unify warring states and bring peace, who tried to show how a ruler controls his ministers as well as the populace, defended the need for spies and violence, and developed the key ideas needed to support the bureaucracies of the emerging and unified states of China and India respectively. Whereas both thinkers disliked (...) the new merchants, Han Feizi seems content with a traditional feudal economy, whereas Kautilya wanted to use the state to increase production and the wealth in the king's treasury. Kautilya also had much more extensive discussions of war and diplomacy. (shrink)

How to defend a small state is an important issue in politics and military affairs. Three important philosophical texts, the Han Fei Zi 韓非子, Plato’s Republic, and the Mencius, discuss this issue. In this article, I will analyze the three accounts offered in these texts, and compare and contrast them. We will see that the Han Fei Zi, a text in the “realist” tradition, offers a typically realist yet rather interesting account of how to save a small state from stronger (...) enemies. Plato’s Republic, too, offers an amoral solution of the defense issue, in spite of its celebration of justice and the Good. The Mencius, a classical Confucian text that is often said to emphasize the power of virtue, does have a normative dimension, but it also takes political reality into account. In fact, it is even more realistic than the first two texts on international interventions in some aspects, partly because, paradoxically, it pays attention to the moral dimension of human affairs. After elaborating and comparing these three accounts, I shall argue that a synthesis may offer a realism-based normative theory of the just defense of a small state. (shrink)

Critics of Confucianism have long been concerned with its emphasis on filial piety (xiao 孝). Among the many traditional strictures of this concept are demands that children serve their parents vigilantly, to do so with the proper outward respect and demeanor, and to yield to parental wishes when personal desires come into conflict with them. Critics have found this problematic as an orientation not only toward one’s parents but also to authority figures more generally. One common response to such criticism (...) is to claim that it misunderstands or misrepresents the true nature of filial piety, which demands not only that one serve, respect, and yield to one’s parents, but also remonstrate with them when they may be veering off the path of what is right and proper. This response, though popular, is unconvincing. First, the passages used to support this claim suggest that remonstration should be conveyed lightly and only when it will not engender bad feelings or estrangement, which may not work with stubborn or insensitive parents. Second, other passages from the same texts suggest that remonstration is not to be done at all, and that pleasing one’s parents is most paramount whether children should remonstrate or accept their parents’ decisions. Lastly, the strongest endorsements for remonstration come from a text of comparatively minor influence, the Xunzi. I conclude that critics’ concerns about blind obedience to authority should not be easily dismissed and deserve serious consideration. (shrink)

Anger, far from being only a personal emotion, often signals a breakdown in existing societal structures like the justice system. This does not mean we should uncritically submit to our angry impulses, but it does mean that anger can reveal larger issues in the world worthy of attention. If we banish anger from the socio-political landscape, we risk losing its insights. To defend that claim, I turn to a range of sources from ancient China and Greece—philosophy, poetry, drama, and political (...) theory—that depict and analyze anger in a variety of situations and people. My basic claim is not that anger is simply “good” or “bad” but rather that it helps reveal and clarify our values, often pointing us towards real situations deserving of our ethical scrutiny. I situate the project amidst ongoing debates in analytic philosophy of emotions and feminist philosophy, joining the conceptual precision and clarity of the former with the latter’s attention to lived experience. Such cross-cultural, multidisciplinary conceptual analysis of anger parochializes Aristotelian understandings of anger by introducing different types and functions of anger. What role does anger play, for example, in a minister rebuking the king in an ancient Chinese court? How do Greek sources depict female anger differently than male anger, and why? By using ancient and comparative sources, I show how deeply anger is shaped by particular cultural and social structures, whilst remaining recognizably anger. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation of order and welfare for Han Fei's philosophy. It will be claimed that the Legalist did indeed show concern for the overall quality of life of society, claiming that his model state would lead to a substantial increase for the individual's welfare. On the other hand, although he acknowledges (and cares) for these positive consequences, Han Fei does not attach any value for legitimizing the system he proposes to them. Even if there were any value (...) attached to benefitting the people, it would be indirect. For Han Fei, a welfare does not legitimize the system but is a consequence of the ‘right system’. He is not concerned with letting the people live better for the sake of the people, but rather with having healthy and motivated subjects, as these are at the same time consequences of, and requirements for, a strong and stable state. The novelty of this paper is to interpret Han Fei's philosophy as welfare-maximization through a specific understanding of the role of virtue. (shrink)

The most defensible justifications of war in the European intellectual tradition hold that war is instrumentally necessary for the maintenance of peace and order. An investigation of Ancient Chinese philosophical attitudes towards war calls this assumption into question. The closest parallel to an instrumental concept of war is found in the Legalist school, but historical experience in China has rejected this. The Confucian school, especially Mencius and Xunxi, insists that war is not instrumental in creating social order, but derives from (...) the prior establishing of cultural and political authority, and thus must be punitive in nature. Even the use of “punitive expeditions” is not instrumental, but rather demonstrative or performative in nature, for if coercive methods are necessary, the authority to use them is arguably absent. War for the Chinese, then, is not justified by the necessity for creating public order, but is in itself a sign of the failure to achieve such an order. This contrasts sharply with the views of the dominant Western thinkers on war, such as Michael Walzer, whose positions insist upon the instrumental necessity of armed force, even to the point of absurdity. The ancient Chinese position suggests that this necessity may be ungrounded. (shrink)