In my dissertation, I present Hermann Cohen's foundation for the history and philosophy of science. My investigation begins with Cohen's formulation of a neo-Kantian epistemology. I analyze Cohen's early work, especially his contributions to 19th century debates about the theory of knowledge. I conclude by examining Cohen's mature theory of science in two works, The Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and its History of 1883, and Cohen's extensive 1914 Introduction to Friedrich Lange's History of Materialism. In the former, Cohen gives (...) an historical and philosophical analysis of the foundations of the infinitesimal method in mathematics. In the latter, Cohen presents a detailed account of Heinrich Hertz's Principles of Mechanics of 1894. Hertz considers a series of possible foundations for mechanics, in the interest of finding a secure conceptual basis for mechanical theories. Cohen argues that Hertz's analysis can be completed, and his goal achieved, by means of a philosophical examination of the role of mathematical principles and fundamental concepts in scientific theories. (shrink)

Kant is well known for his restrictive conception of proper science. In the present paper I will try to explain why Kant adopted this conception. I will identify three core conditions which Kant thinks a proper science must satisfy: systematicity, objective grounding, and apodictic certainty. These conditions conform to conditions codified in the Classical Model of Science. Kant’s infamous claim that any proper natural science must be mathematical should be understood on the basis of these conditions. In order to substantiate (...) this reading, I will show that only in this way it can be explained why Kant thought (1) that mathematics has a particular foundational function with respect to the natural sciences and (2) as such secures their scientific status. (shrink)

In his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, Kant claims that chemistry is a science, but not a proper science (like physics), because it does not adequately allow for the application of mathematics to its objects. This paper argues that the application of mathematics to a proper science is best thought of as depending upon a coordination between mathematically constructible concepts and those of the science. In physics, the proper science that exhausts the a priori knowledge of objects of the outer sense, (...) only motions and concepts reducible to motions can be legitimately coordinated with mathematical constructions. Since chemistry can neither achieve its own a priori principles of coordination nor be reduced to the coordinated doctrine of motion, it is a merely improper science. (shrink)

Nella Dialettica trascendentale Kant annuncia una deduzione delle idee della ragione, necessaria se le idee devono avere una validità oggettiva, seppur indeterminata. Questa deduzione dovrà costituire una sorta di schematismo trascendentale e, tuttavia, viene soltanto annunciata e programmata, ma rimane in forma di abbozzo. I paragrafi 61-68 della Critica della capacità di giudizio sembrano costituire un completamento del programma di uno schematismo dell’uso regolativo della ragione. La tesi che sostengo è che effettivamente è possibile accostare le due definizioni di idea (...) regolativa, nella prima e nella terza Critica, restituendone la continuità, ma è anche da tener presente la significativa evoluzione del pensiero kantiano che genera uno spostamento dall’idea di mondo all’idea di organismo. Sulla base di questa convinzione, sosterrò che l’idea di organismo sta a fondamento dell’uso costitutivo del giudizio sulla natura e permette un’applicazione del principio di causalità alle scienze naturali. Non è però l’idea regolativa a dover essere subordinata al giudizio costitutivo, ma è piuttosto l’uso ideale della nozione di natura a precedere logicamente la sintesi categoriale. (shrink)