This paper explores how embryos have been representedin law. It argues that two main models haveunderpinned legal discourse concerning the embryo. Onediscourse, which has become increasingly prevalent,views embryos as legal subjects or persons. Suchrepresentations are facilitated by technologicaldevelopments such as ultrasound imaging. In additionto influencing Parliamentary debate prior to thepassage of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act1990, images of embryos as persons featureprominently in popular culture, including advertisingand films, and this discourse came to the fore in the`orphaned embryo' debate in (...) 1996. The main opposingdiscourse dismisses embryos as commodifiable objects,which fits with a trend towards legal recognition thatreproductive materials such as sperm may be classifiedas property which may be donated or sold. In thecase of cryo-preserved embryos these competingperspectives have resulted in litigation over thestatus of frozen embryos. In this paper I argue thatit might be productive to shift the debate from thispolarised dispute over whether embryos matter or not,whether they are pre-persons or commodities. Instead,I suggest that we should attempt to locate them in abiotechnological milieu, where cyborg metaphors may beutilised, and questions of how we should treat embryoswould be contextualised alongside our response toother cyborgs. (shrink)

Restrictions on research on therapeutic cloning are questionable as they inhibit the development of a technique which holds promise for succesful application of pluripotent stem cells in clinical treatment of severe diseases. It is argued in this article that the ethical concerns are less problematic using therapeutic cloning compared with using fertilised eggs as the source for stem cells. The moral status of an enucleated egg cell transplanted with a somatic cell nucleus is found to be more clearly not equivalent (...) to that of a human being. Based on ethical considerations alone, research into therapeutic cloning should be encouraged in order to develop therapeutic applications of stem cells. (shrink)

The proposal for reproducing human generations in vitro raises the question to what extent parenthood is possible in embryos and to what extent human rights and interests are dependent on conscious awareness. This paper argues that the interest in not being made a parent non-consensually for the benefit of others persists throughout the lifespan of the individual human organism. We do not become genetic parents by learning that we are parents; rather, we discover (or fail to discover) an existing genetic (...) relationship between our offspring and ourselves. The claim to genetic parenthood of an embryo used for reproduction in vitro is, if anything, clearer than the claim of the adult for whom gametes are derived via ips cells, in that an embryo’s cells, unlike an adult’s somatic cells, are already functionally geared to producing gametes (among other types of cell). An embryo used to make gametes that are used in reproduction is immediately and non-consensually made a genetic parent and to that extent is wronged whether or not the parent embryo survives – as some could survive – the harvesting of cells. All human individuals carry objective interests in benefits appropriate to the kind of being they are; these include the stake in not being made a parent without one’s consent, whether posthumously or otherwise. (shrink)

Mary Shelley’sFrankensteinhas captured the public imagination ever since it was first published over 200 years ago. While the narrative reflected 19th-century anxieties about the emerging scientific revolution, it also suggested some clear moral lessons that remain relevant today. In a sense,Frankensteinwas a work of bioethics written a century and a half before the discipline came to exist. This paper revisits the lessons ofFrankensteinregarding the creation and manipulation of life in the light of recent developments in stem cell and neurobiological research. (...) It argues that these lessons are becoming more relevant than ever. (shrink)