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  1. Epistemic Dependence and Oppression: A Telling Relationship.Ezgi Sertler - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):394-408.
    Epistemic dependence refers to our social mechanisms of reliance in practices of knowledge production. Epistemic oppression concerns persistent and unwarranted exclusions from those practices. This article examines the relationship between these two frameworks and demonstrates that attending to their relationship is a fruitful practice for applied epistemology. Paying attention to relations of epistemic dependence and how exclusive they are can help us track epistemically oppressive practices. In order to show this, I introduce a taxonomy of epistemic dependence. I argue that (...)
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  • Feminist social epistemology.Heidi Grasswick - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • How could contemporary social theory contribute to socialized epistemology?Seppo Poutanen - 2001 - Social Epistemology 15 (1):27 – 41.
    This paper will first examine the different versions of social or socialized epistemology, a field that has gathered much support among epistemologists in recent years. After the necessary classification, the paper goes on to suggest that socialized epistemology could benefit from contemporary social theory, and Derek Layder's views are presented as especially fruitful in this respect. To give grounds for this suggestion, features of Layder's theory will be contrasted with certain shortcomings in 'conservative' and 'feminist' versions of socialized epistemology.
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  • A Group Epistemology is a Group Necessity: A Reply to Fallis and Mathiesen.Miika Vähämaa - 2013 - Social Epistemology 27 (1):26 - 31.
    (2013). A Group Epistemology is a Group Necessity: A Reply to Fallis and Mathiesen. Social Epistemology: Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 26-31. doi: 10.1080/02691728.2012.760667.
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  • “Epistemological Communities” and the Problem of Epistemic Agency.Chris Calvert-Minor - 2011 - Social Epistemology 25 (4):341 - 360.
    There is a tendency, a bad tendency, to make epistemic agency the central focus of epistemology. In brief, epistemologists have traditionally elevated epistemic agency as the crucial issue to be addressed, and ask all other epistemological questions in light of that issue. This is not surprising given the Cartesian influence on epistemology, but I argue that epistemic agency should not always be the central focus of epistemology. There are times when giving central place to epistemic agency gets in the way (...)
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  • Groups as Epistemic Communities: Social Forces and Affect as Antecedents to Knowledge.Miika Vähämaa - 2013 - Social Epistemology 27 (1):3 - 20.
    (2013). Groups as Epistemic Communities: Social Forces and Affect as Antecedents to Knowledge. Social Epistemology: Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 3-20. doi: 10.1080/02691728.2012.760660.
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  • Testimony, epistemic difference, and privilege: How feminist epistemology can improve our understanding of the communication of knowledge.Lisa A. Bergin - 2002 - Social Epistemology 16 (3):197 – 213.
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  • Individuals-in-communities: The search for a feminist model of epistemic subjects.Heidi E. Grasswick - 2004 - Hypatia 19 (3):85-120.
    : Feminist epistemologists have found the atomistic view of knowers provided by classical epistemology woefully inadequate. An obvious alternative for feminists is Lynn Hankinson Nelson's suggestion that it is communities that know. However, I argue that Nelson's view is problematic for feminists, and I offer instead a conception of knowers as "individuals-in-communities." This conception is preferable, given the premises and goals of feminist epistemologists, because it emphasizes the relations between knowers and their communities and the relevance of these relations for (...)
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