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  1. A cognitive neuroscience hypothesis of mood and depression.Moshe Bar - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (11):456.
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  • Analytic thinking: do you feel like it?Valerie Thompson & Kinga Morsanyi - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):93-105.
    A major challenge for Dual Process Theories of reasoning is to predict the circumstances under which intuitive answers reached on the basis of Type 1 processing are kept or discarded in favour of analytic, Type 2 processing (Thompson 2009 ). We propose that a key determinant of the probability that Type 2 processes intervene is the affective response that accompanies Type 1 processing. This affective response arises from the fluency with which the initial answer is produced, such that fluently produced (...)
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  • (1 other version)Temporal experience in mania.Marcin Moskalewicz & Michael A. Schwartz - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14.
    The paper examines both the phenomenology of the manic self as well as critical aspects of manic neurobiology, focusing, with respect to both domains, on manic temporality. We argue that the distortions of lived time in mania exceed mere acceleration and are fundamental for manic affectivity. Mania involves radical acceleration and radical asynchronicity, which result in an instantaneous existence. People with mania rebel against the facticity of reality and suffer from an existential leap towards the future, in which the self (...)
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  • (1 other version)Temporal experience in mania.Marcin Moskalewicz & Michael A. Schwartz - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (2):291-304.
    The paper examines both the phenomenology of the manic self as well as critical aspects of manic neurobiology, focusing, with respect to both domains, on manic temporality. We argue that the distortions of lived time in mania exceed mere acceleration and are fundamental for manic affectivity. Mania involves radical acceleration and radical asynchronicity, which result in an instantaneous existence. People with mania rebel against the facticity of reality and suffer from an existential leap towards the future, in which the self (...)
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