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  1. Feeling of doing in obsessive–compulsive checking.S. Belayachi & M. Van der Linden - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):534-546.
    Research on self-agency emphasizes the importance of a comparing mechanism, which scans for a match between anticipated and actual outcomes, in the subjective experience of doing.This study explored the “feeling of doing” in individuals with checking symptoms by examining the mechanism involved in the experienced agency for outcomes that matched expectations. This mechanism was explored using a task in which the subliminal priming of potential action-effects generally enhances people’s feeling of causing these effects when they occur, due to the unconscious (...)
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  • The mind’s best trick: How we experience conscious will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):65-69.
    We often consciously will our own actions. This experience is so profound that it tempts us to believe that our actions are caused by consciousness. It could also be a trick, however – the mind’s way of estimating its own apparent authorship by drawing causal inferences about relationships between thoughts and actions. Cognitive, social, and neuropsychological studies of apparent mental causation suggest that experiences of conscious will frequently depart from actual causal processes and so might not reflect direct perceptions of (...)
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  • Voluntary involuntariness: Thought suppression and the regulation of the experience of will.Daniel M. Wegner & James A. K. Erskine - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):684-694.
    Participants were asked to carry out a series of simple tasks while following mental control instructions. In advance of each task, they either suppressed thoughts of their intention to perform the task, concentrated on such thoughts, or monitored their thoughts without trying to change them. Suppression resulted in reduced reports of intentionality as compared to monitoring, and as compared to concentration. There was a weak trend for suppression to enhance reported intentionality for a repetition of the action carried out after (...)
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  • Precis of.D. M. Wegner - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27.
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