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  1. Neuronal correlates of “free will” are associated with regional specialization in the human intrinsic/default network.Ilan Goldberg, Shimon Ullman & Rafael Malach - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):587-601.
    Recently, we proposed a fundamental subdivision of the human cortex into two complementary networks—an “extrinsic” one which deals with the external environment, and an “intrinsic” one which largely overlaps with the “default mode” system, and deals with internally oriented and endogenous mental processes. Here we tested this hypothesis by contrasting decision making under external and internally-derived conditions. Subjects were presented with an external cue, and were required to either follow an external instruction or to ignore it and follow a voluntary (...)
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  • Conscious intention and human action: Review of the rise and fall of the readiness potential and Libet’s clock. [REVIEW]Edward J. Neafsey - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 94 (C):103171.
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  • Belief in free will as an adaptive, ungrounded belief.Matthew Smithdeal - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1241-1252.
    False beliefs and delusions are usually regarded negatively, especially in psychology and evolutionary biology. Recently, McKay and Dennett have argued that there are ungrounded beliefs which confer benefits on individuals even if they are false. I propose to expand this class of beliefs to include the belief that one has free will, and I will defend the claim that this belief is advantageous, even if it is false. One derives one’s belief in control from one’s experience of control, which is (...)
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  • Priming of actions increases sense of control over unexpected outcomes.Nura Sidarus, Valérian Chambon & Patrick Haggard - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1403-1411.
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  • Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Scientific Epiphenomenalism.Alfred R. Mele - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:426871.
    This article addresses two influential lines of argument for what might be termed “scientific epiphenomenalism” about conscious intentions – the thesis that neither conscious intentions nor their physical correlates are among the causes of bodily motions – and links this thesis to skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. One line of argument is based on Benjamin Libet’s neuroscientific work on free will. The other is based on a mixed bag of findings presented by social psychologist Daniel Wegner. It is (...)
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