Scholarship in the multidisciplinary field of genocide studies often emphasizes body counts and the number of biological deaths as a way of measuring and comparing the severity and scope of individual genocides. The prevalence of this way of framing genocide is problematic insofar it risks marginalizing the voices and experiences of victims who may not succumb to biological death but nevertheless suffer the loss of family members and other loved ones, and suffer the destruction of relationships, as well as the (...) foundational institutions that give rise to and sustain those relationships. The concept of social death, which Claudia Card offers as the central evil of genocide, marks a radical shift in conceptualizing genocide and provides space for recovering the marginalized voices of many who suffer the evils of genocide but do not suffer biological death. Here her concept of social death is explored, defended, and criticized. (shrink)

During the 1970s, both the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks in Soviet Central Asia compared their plight to that of the Palestinians. The Stalin regime deported both the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks from their homelands to dispersed settlements in Central Asia. The similarities between the Soviet policies of expelling and permanently excluding the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks from their homelands and similar Israeli policies towards the Palestinians are not entirely coincidental. The Zionists based their mass expulsion of Palestinians (...) in 1948 and subsequent prohibition on allowing them to return to their homes in part on the Soviet model. The similarities between the two instances of ethnic cleansing are due in large part to this conscious emulation of Stalin's methods by the Zionists. (shrink)

Genocide is defined here as organized and unilateral mass killing on the basis of ethnicity. While some have focused on genocide as a type of deviance, most genocide is also social control — a response to behavior itself defined as deviant. As such, it can be explained as a part of a general theory of social control. Black's theories of social control explain the handling of conflicts with their social geometry — that is, with the social characteristics of those involved (...) in the conflict. Here, Blackian theories of social control are extended to specify the social geometry of genocide as follows: genocide varies directly with immobility, cultural distance, relational distance, functional independence, and inequality; and it is greater in a downward direction than in an upward or lateral direction. This theory of genocide can be applied to numerous genocides throughout history, and it is capable of ordering much of the known variation in genocide — such as when and where it occurs, how severe it is, and who participates. (shrink)

Enega izmed največjih izzivov sodobnega utopianizma predstavlja protislovje med pozitivno usmerjenostjo v prihodnost in njenimi negativnimi reprezentacijami. V nasprotju s prevladujočimi pristopi, ki so usmerjeni k širokim in vseobsegajočim opisom utopije na podlagi nekega koncepta, avtor pričujočega prispevka zagovarja prepričanje, da obstaja ustreznejši način dojemanja utopije in utopianizma, ki napreduje prek vrste dihotomij, nasprotij ali celo paradoksov. Od zgodnjih utopičnih strategij, katerim lahko sledimo več tisočletij v preteklost, do primerov iz dvajsetega in enaindvajsetega stoletja, je utopija vedno izražala nasprotujoče si (...) težnje, ki zahtevajo temeljitejšo obravnavo. Lahko si je namreč zamisliti, da v tej kontradiktorni naravi utopije leži ne samo ključ do razumevanja preteklosti in sedanjosti, temveč tudi prihodnosti. V tem kontekstu se kot najpomembnejša kaže razlika med »resnično« utopijo in »lažno« utopijo. Kljub temu, da se je v dvajsetem stoletju utopično upanje sprevrnilo v distopični strah, pot k drugačni in po možnosti boljši prihodnosti ponuja le »resnična«, ikonoklastična utopija, ki ohranja pri življenju bržkone najpomembnejši vidik človeške eksistence: upanje. (shrink)

Mixed emotions are conceptualized as involving the co-occurrence of states opposite in valence. One might expect that combinations of opposites would show diminished overall emotion intensity. But is this always the case? If not, when will mixed emotions be characterized by high intensity, and when by low intensity? In this article, theories of emotion-eliciting appraisal and emotion intensity are employed to understand mixed emotions and phenomena of passion. It is proposed that intense emotions are produced by transformative events: perceived motive-relevant (...) changes that are important, large, and rapid. Transformative events that can move a person between greatly motive-inconsistent and greatly motive-consistent outcomes constitute one potent path to passion. Illustrative phenomena of passion, mixed emotions, and related research are discussed. (shrink)

Recent philosophical research on normativity has clarified the nature and dynamics of social norms. Social norms are distinguished from legal and moral norms on the basis of their scope, their grounds, their characteristic forms of accountability, or some combination of these features. Because of their distinct character, social norms can reinforce practical prescriptions, prohibitions, and permissions provided to particular actors by legal or moral norms. They also can conflict drastically with those prescriptions, prohibitions, and permissions resulting in serious practical dilemmas. (...) The identification of normative principles capable of resolving practical dilemmas arising from conflicts between different kinds of norms is a major aim of contemporary moral and political philosophy. This dissertation contributes to this aim by establishing the significance of conflicts between social norms and legal or moral norms during mass atrocities and liberalizing political transitions. The dissertation argues that social norms, and changes in social norms, are critical components of accurate descriptions and responsible evaluations both legal and moral of the actions of individuals and groups before, during, and after mass atrocities. The dissertation contends, further, that distinct principles of justice may apply to transitional efforts by non-state actors to transform social norms in societies recovering from large-scale crimes. Three principal results follow from this dissertations effort to integrate the conceptual framework of social norms into the study of mass atrocity. First, the dissertation clarifies and extends the historiographical thesis of norm transformation, according to which participation by ordinary individuals in mass atrocities is at least partially explained by transformations in basic norms that structure social and political life. Second, the dissertation identifies a novel basis on which to apportion legal and moral accountability for mass atrocities between individuals and groups or collectivities i.e. on the basis of the specific contributions of social norms. Third, the dissertation provides new support for the disputed claim that distinct principles of justice apply to the various actors involved in liberalizing political transitions. (shrink)

After placing the issue of holding international institutional agents responsible within a theoretical context, this article takes up the case of the UN's role in the Rwandan genocide. Through an examination of the extensive literature that deals either directly or incidentally with the UN's role and responsibility during the period prior to the outbreak of mass killing on 6 April 1994, this essay tests a slightly modified version of Toni Erskine's theory of why international institutional agents can be held responsible (...) for their actions. The article details the various ways that different parts of the UN have been held responsible for failing to prevent and mitigate the genocide. Moreover, it documents specific failures in four different categories: failures in communication, deliberation, decision-making, and implementation. The article concludes that the extensive literature on the Rwandan genocide conforms to a slightly modified version of the Erskine model. It also suggests that practical, functional reforms — which are far easier to implement than structural reforms — can be initiated based on that model. (shrink)