Switch to: References

Citations of:

Existence: Who needs it? The non‐identity problem and merely possible people

Rivka Weinberg

Bioethics 27 (9):471-484 (2012)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Nonexistent objects.Maria Reicher - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details Are there nonexistent objects, i.e., objects that do not exist? Some examples often cited are: Zeus, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes, Vulcan (the hypothetical planet postulated by the 19th century astronomer Le Verrier), the perpetual motion machine, the golden mountain, the fountain of youth, the round square, etc. Some important philosophers have thought that the very concept of a nonexistent object is contradictory (Hume) or logically ill-formed (Kant, Frege), while others (Leibniz, Meinong, the Russell of Principles of Mathematics) have embraced it wholeheartedly. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 37 citations
Defending the de dicto approach to the non-identity problem.Joona Räsänen - 2023 - Monash Bioethics Review 41 (2):124-135.details Is it wrong to create a blind child, for example by in vitro fertilization, if you could create a sighted child instead? Intuitively many people believe it is wrong, but this belief is difficult to justify. When there is a possibility to create and select either ‘blind’ or ‘sighted’ embryos choosing a set of ‘blind’ embryos seems to harm no-one since choosing ‘sighted’ embryos would create a different child altogether. So when the parents choose ‘blind’ embryos, they give some specific (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Intergenerational Rights and the Problem of Cross-Temporal Relations.Aaron M. Griffith - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):693-710.details This paper considers the prospects for a theory of intergenerational rights in light of certain ontologies of time. It is argued that the attempt to attribute rights to future persons or obligations to present persons towards future persons, faces serious difficulties if the existence of the future is denied. The difficulty of attributing rights to non-existent future persons is diagnosed as a particularly intractable version of the ‘problem of cross-temporal relations’ that plagues No-Futurist views like presentism. I develop a version (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Prudence and Responsibility to Self in an Identity Crisis.Adam Cureton - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (4):815-841.details A comprehensive theory of rational prudence would explain how a person should adjudicate among the conflicting interests of her past, present, future and counterfactual selves. For example, when a person is having an identity crisis, perhaps because she has suddenly become disabled, she may be left with no sense of purpose to keep her going. In her despondent state, she may think it prudent to give up on life now even if she would soon adopt a different set of values (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Gratitude for (One's Own) Life.Matthew Lee Anderson - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):275-288.details This essay argues that gratitude for one's own life is an intelligible attitude to have. It does so by arguing that reducing pro-attitudes in response to unintentional benefits to “appreciation” is too broad. Instead, such “appreciation” can be understood as gratitude if such benefits satisfy a number of conditions that track or are analogous to why we care about interpersonally bestowed benefits. One's own life satisfies those four conditions, which can make gratitude for it intelligible—when it is perceived as a (...) benefit. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark

1