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  1. The Courage of Conviction: Andreia as Precondition for Philosophic Examination in Plato's Protagoras and Republic.Paul Carelli - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (3):438-458.
    There are at least two apparently conflicting views of courage found in Plato's dialogues: the intellectualist view exemplified by Socrates’s identification of courage with wisdom as found in the Protagoras; and the dispositional view of courage as a natural temperament to overcome fear in situations of danger, the necessary qualification for the auxiliary class in the Republic. In this paper I argue that these views are complementary, dispositional courage being a necessary precondition for the pursuit of the proper human excellence (...)
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  • The Virtue of Dialogue, Dialogue as Virtue in Plato's Protagoras.Francisco J. Gonzalez - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (1):33-66.
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  • Socratic Courage in Plato's Socratic Dialogues.Shigeru Yonezawa - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (4):645-665.
    This article considers Socrates's conception of courage in Plato's Socratic dialogues. Although the Laches, which is the only dialogue devoted in toto to a pursuit of the definition of courage, does not explicitly provide Socrates's definition of courage, I shall point out clues therein which contribute to an understanding of Socrates's conception of courage. The Protagoras is a peculiar dialogue in which Socrates himself offers a definition of courage. Attending to the dramatic structure and personalities of the dialogue, I will (...)
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  • Pleasure, Desire, and Akrasia in Plato’s Republic.John Mouracade - 2016 - Méthexis 28 (1):33-46.
    The moral psychology put forth by Socrates in the Protagoras is customarily treated as an anomaly that must be discounted or dismissed as not authentically Platonic. Socrates asserts that all choices are determined by the perception of pleasure and pain and, on this basis, argues that akrasia is impossible. In this paper, I argue that these two key elements of the Protagoras’ moral psychology are fully embraced in the Republic and should be considered authentically Platonic.
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