In a lecture on ‘Science and Psychology’ Dr Drury distinguishes between ‘a psychology which has insight into individual characters’ and ‘a psychology which is concerned with the scientific study of universal types’, one which comprises ‘those subjects that are studied in a university faculty of psychology’. The former, and not the latter, he says, is psychology in ‘the original meaning of the word’. ‘We might say of a great novelist such as Tolstoy or George Eliot that they show profound psychological (...) insight into the characters they depict … In general, it is the great novelists, dramatists, biographers, historians, that are the real psychologists.’. (shrink)

In a lecture on ‘Science and Psychology’ Dr Drury distinguishes between ‘a psychology which has insight into individual characters’ and ‘a psychology which is concerned with the scientific study of universal types’, one which comprises ‘those subjects that are studied in a university faculty of psychology’. The former, and not the latter, he says, is psychology in ‘the original meaning of the word’. ‘We might say of a great novelist such as Tolstoy or George Eliot that they show profound psychological (...) insight into the characters they depict … In general, it is the great novelists, dramatists, biographers, historians, that are the real psychologists.’. (shrink)

It is sometimes said that a human being has a soul, whereas animals and lifeless things do not. The distinction made is of significance probably for most religions. Although it sets man apart and places him in a unique category, it should not be taken to imply that there is no difference between what is alive and has sentience, apart from man, and what is lifeless and unconscious. This was Descartes' error. For he ran together several distinctions and equated the (...) soul with consciousness. (shrink)

It is sometimes said that a human being has a soul, whereas animals and lifeless things do not. The distinction made is of significance probably for most religions. Although it sets man apart and places him in a unique category, it should not be taken to imply that there is no difference between what is alive and has sentience, apart from man, and what is lifeless and unconscious. This was Descartes' error. For he ran together several distinctions and equated the (...) soul with consciousness. (shrink)

The paper argues that an internal debate within Wittgensteinian philosophy leads to issues associated rather with the later philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Rush Rhees's identification of the limitations of the notion of a “language game” to illuminate the relation between language and reality leads to his discussion of what is involved in the “reality” of language: “anything that is said has sense-if living has sense, not otherwise.” But what is it for living to have sense? Peter Winch provides an interpretation (...) and application of Rhees's argument in his discussion of the “reality” of Zande witchcraft and magic in “Understanding a Primitive Society”. There he argues that such sense is provided by a language game concerned with the ineradicable contingency of human life, such as (he claims) Zande witchcraft to be. I argue, however, that Winch's account fails to answer the question why Zande witchcraft can find no application within our lives. I suggest that answering this requires us to raise the question of why Zande witchcraft “fits” with their other practices but cannot with ours, a question of “sense” which cannot be answered by reference to another language game. I use Joseph Epes Brown's account of Native American cultures (in Epes Brown 2001) as an exemplification of a form of coherence that constitutes what we may call a “world”. I then discuss what is involved in this, relating this coherence to a relation to the temporal, which provides an internal connection between the senses of the “real” embodied in the different linguistic practices of these cultures. I relate this to the later Heidegger's account of the “History of Being”, of the historical worlds of Western culture and increasingly of the planet. I conclude with an indication of concerns and issues this approach raises, ones characteristic of “Continental” rather than Wittgensteinian philosophy. (shrink)

Simone Weil is widely recognized today as one of the profound religious thinkers of the twentieth century. Yet while her interpretation of natural science is critical to Weil's overall understanding of religious faith, her writings on science have received little attention compared with her more overtly theological writings. The present essay, which builds on Vance Morgan's Weaving the World: Simone Weil on Science, Necessity, and Love (2005), critically examines Weil's interpretation of the history of science. Weil believed that mathematical science, (...) for the ancient Pythagoreans a mystical expression of the love of God, had in the modern period degenerated into a kind of reification of method that confuses the means of representing nature with nature itself. Beginning with classical (Newtonian) science's representation of nature as a machine, and even more so with the subsequent assimilation of symbolic algebra as the principal language of mathematical physics, modern science according to Weil trades genuine insight into the order of the world for symbolic manipulation yielding mere predictive success and technological domination of nature. I show that Weil's expressed desire to revive a Pythagorean scientific approach, inspired by the "mysterious complicity" in nature between brute necessity and love, must be recast in view of the intrinsically symbolic character of modern mathematical science. I argue further that a genuinely mystical attitude toward nature is nascent within symbolic mathematical science itself. (shrink)

In the Christian tradition it has generally been claimed that God, being perfectly good, has the attribute not only of impeccantia but also of impeccabilitas . Thus, for example, Aquinas held that ‘God is unable to will anything evil. Hence it is evident that God cannot sin’; and according to the Westminster Confession, ‘God,…being holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin’.

This article attempts to elucidate the ethical meaning behind the words ‘the ethics of self’ and ‘an ethical self’, particularly in the light of Noddings’ ‘ethical self’, in order to show the relevance of these terms to the practice of ethical caring. It examines the relationship that Noddings believes exists between one’s actual self and the vision one has of one’s ideal self. I attempt to draw out a meaning derived from the texts in which this concept has been captured, (...) while at the same time juxtaposing the concept ‘ethic of care’ from my own research, together with the meaning given by philosophers Peta Bowden, Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil, who have written on the subject, albeit indirectly in some instances. A participant in a colleague’s research on care and patient satisfaction used similar expressions, and gave the impetus for this article. (shrink)

Women’s pain remains underappreciated, undertheorized, and undertreated in both medicine and theology. The ascetic practices of women in pain, however, can help Christians understand and navigate their own pain and suffering, particularly because they are experienced in the context of chronic illness and disability. In what follows, I argue that Christians would do better to view the pain that accompanies disability and chronic illness as a potential resource for spiritual practice rather than an example of sin or evil. I begin (...) with a brief overview of the most common theological explanations for the relationship between disability and sin within contemporary Christian writings on disability. What is often neglected in these conversations is the acknowledgment of pain in the disability experience. Likewise, discussions of evil often attempt to explain the existence of pain and suffering, but rarely address the practical realities of pain. As a way to begin to remedy the lack of attention to the experience of chronic pain for those living with illness and disability, I consider what it would mean to live faithfully with pain by examining the lives of three holy women who provide examples of what it means to interpret, manage, and share their pain within the body of Christ. (shrink)

On Simone Weil’s “Pythagorean” view, mathematics has a mystical significance. In this paper, the nature of this significance and the coherence of Weil’s view are explored. To sharpen the discussion, consideration is given to both Rush Rhees’ criticism of Weil and Vance Morgan’s rebuttal of Rhees. It is argued here that while Morgan underestimates the force of Rhees’ criticism, Rhees’ take on Weil is, nevertheless, flawed for two reasons. First, Rhees fails to engage adequately with either the assumptions underlying Weil’s (...) religious conception of philosophy or its dialectical method. Second, Rhees’ reading of Weil reflects an anti‐Platonist conception of mathematics his justification of which is unsound and whose influence impedes recognition of the coherence of Weil’s position. (shrink)