This inaugural handbook documents the distinctive research field that utilizes history and philosophy in investigation of theoretical, curricular and pedagogical issues in the teaching of science and mathematics. It is contributed to by 130 researchers from 30 countries; it provides a logically structured, fully referenced guide to the ways in which science and mathematics education is, informed by the history and philosophy of these disciplines, as well as by the philosophy of education more generally. The first handbook to cover the (...) field, it lays down a much-needed marker of progress to date and provides a platform for informed and coherent future analysis and research of the subject. -/- The publication comes at a time of heightened worldwide concern over the standard of science and mathematics education, attended by fierce debate over how best to reform curricula and enliven student engagement in the subjects There is a growing recognition among educators and policy makers that the learning of science must dovetail with learning about science; this handbook is uniquely positioned as a locus for the discussion. -/- The handbook features sections on pedagogical, theoretical, national, and biographical research, setting the literature of each tradition in its historical context. Each chapter engages in an assessment of the strengths and weakness of the research addressed, and suggests potentially fruitful avenues of future research. A key element of the handbook’s broader analytical framework is its identification and examination of unnoticed philosophical assumptions in science and mathematics research. It reminds readers at a crucial juncture that there has been a long and rich tradition of historical and philosophical engagements with science and mathematics teaching, and that lessons can be learnt from these engagements for the resolution of current theoretical, curricular and pedagogical questions that face teachers and administrators. (shrink)

This paper examines how the new field of neuroethics is responding to the old problem of difference, particularly to those ideas of biological difference emerging from neuroimaging research that purports to further delineate our understanding of sex and/or gender differences in the brain. As the field develops, it is important to ask what is new about neuroethics compared to bioethics in this regard, and whether the concept of difference is being problematized within broader contexts of power and representation. As a (...) feminist science studies scholar trained in the neurosciences, it seems logical to me that, as a growing field, neuroethics should reach out to the rich bodies of scholarship on the history of medicine, feminist theory and feminist bioethics while attempting to approach discussions of sex, gender and sexuality differences in the brain. What is also clear to me is that feminist scholars need to learn how to engage with neuroimaging studies on sex, gender and sexuality not just to critique, but also to productively contribute to neuroscientific research. The field of neuroethics can potentially provide the appropriate forum for this interdisciplinary engagement and create opportunities for shared perplexity. I suggest three possible points of departure for creating this shared perplexity, namely (i) is difference being measured in the study for the purpose of understanding difference in and of itself, or for the purpose of division?; (ii) is there an appreciation for biological complexity?; and (iii) is it assumed that structural differences can be conveniently translated into functional differences? (shrink)

Many complex behaviors are genetically hardwired. Based on previous findings on genetic control of mating and other behaviors in invertebrate and mammalian systems, I suggest that genetic control of complex behaviors is modular: first, dedicated genes specify different behavioral patterns; secondly, separable genetic networks govern distinct behavioral components. I speculate that modular genetic encoding of complex behaviors may in part reflect modularity in brain development and function.Editor's suggested further reading in BioEssays From songs to synapses: Molecular mechanisms of birdsong memory (...) Abstract. (shrink)

Personality Psychology: Current Status and Prospects For the Future I want to consider the current status and future of the field of personality psychology, often basing my observations on my own research and theoretical interests. Let me begin by summarizing what I have to say in terms of three points of emphasis: First, the field of personality can be viewed in terms of three disciplines—trait, social cognitive, and psychodynamic—each associated with its own empirical procedures and observations. That is, each is (...) associated with its own form of personality data but all represent relevant data. Second, there is a need in the field for a dynamic systems perspective, one that emphasizes the interplay among the parts of the personality system in the course of the person's ongoing transactions with the physical and interpersonal environment. Third, in the future personality psychologists increasingly will have to integrate findings from biopsychology and neuroscience into their theories and research questions. This raises the question of how they can create bridges across levels of analysis and avoid the problem of reductionism. In other words, there is the issue of how personality psychologists will address the mind-body problem. (shrink)

The quest for molecular mechanisms that guide axons or specify synaptic contacts has largely focused on molecules that intuitively relate to the idea of an “instruction.” By contrast, “permissive” factors are traditionally considered background machinery without contribution to the information content of a molecularly executed instruction. In this essay, I recast this dichotomy as a continuum from permissive to instructive actions of single factors that provide relative contributions to a necessarily collaborative effort. Individual molecules or other factors do not constitute (...) absolute instructions by themselves; they provide necessary context for each other, thereby creating a composite that defines the overall instruction. The idea of composite instructions leads to two main conclusions: first, a composite of many seemingly permissive factors can define a specific instruction even in the absence of a single dominant contributor; second, individual factors are not necessarily related intuitively to the overall instruction or phenotypic outcome. (shrink)

Stein has raised a fundamental problem for any attempt to characterize instrumentalism and realism as substantive alternatives. This is the distinguishability problem, which consists in the problem of developing a form of instrumentalism that is substantially different from a plausible realist alternative and the problem of showing that this form of instrumentalism does justice to actual scientific practice. Using Stein’s own discussion of Maxwell, I formulate instrumentalism and realism as a scientist’s attitudes toward models, where an attitude is understood to (...) be a complex of the scientist’s belief and intention regarding models. Developing a case study of Benzer’s modeling practice, I show that each attitude can structure inquiry differently and argue that to understand certain aspects of scientific practice, such as the practice of genetic mapping in Benzer’s work, we sometimes need to appeal to the coexistence of these attitudes. (shrink)

Historians tend to speak of the problem of the origin of species or the species question, as if it were a monolithic problem. In reality, the phrase refers to a, historically, surprisingly fluid and pluriform scientific issue. It has, in the course of the past five centuries, been used in no less than ten different ways or contexts. A clear taxonomy of these separate problems is useful or relevant in two ways. It certainly helps to disentangle confusions that have inevitably (...) emerged in the literature in its absence. It may, secondly, also help us to gain a more thorough understanding, or sharper view, of the history of evolutionary thought. A consequent problem-centric look at that history through the lens of various origin of species problems certainly yields intriguing results, including and particularly for our understanding of the genesis of the Wallace–Darwin theory of evolution through natural selection. (shrink)

We discuss a less known aspect of Feynman’s multifaceted scientific work, centered about his interest in molecular biology, which came out around 1959 and lasted for several years. After a quick historical reconstruction about the birth of molecular biology, we focus on Feynman’s work on genetics with Robert S. Edgar in the laboratory of Max Delbruck, which was later quoted by Francis Crick and others in relevant papers, as well as in Feynman’s lectures given at the Hughes Aircraft Company on (...) biology, organic chemistry and microbiology, whose notes taken by the attendee John Neer are available. An intriguing perspective comes out about one of the most interesting scientists of the XX century. (shrink)