A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel’s dialectical method is that employing it involves advancing a false account and then modifying it to be closer to the truth. I will call this the Modification View. In this essay, I argue that the Modification View is incorrect. Hegel’s insight, I show, is that one can only explain the objective validity of a form of thought through employing that very form. Consequently, the dialectical method cannot relate to its subject matter as (...) something given to it, and so cannot involve advancing and then correcting errors in one’s account. (shrink)

The main goal of the article is to briefly review the difference between analytical and synthetic in Hegel's philosophy, as well as to determine whether this philosopher was a follower of Kant's philosophy or not. First, in the "Introduction" section, the difference between analytical and synthetic in Kant's philosophy is shown; moreover, Kant's influence on Hegel and, generally, on the period in question and the conclusions of both scientists on this issue are analyzed. In the article, the main features of (...) Hegel's and Kant's worldviews and some conclusions related to the pair of concepts in Hegel's philosophy, i.e., analytical and synthetic concepts, are examined. In the conclusion of the article, Hegel's main philosophical views are identified, and the possibility of resolving the difference between analytical and synthetic through dialectical judgment is put forward. (shrink)

The article examines the role of Hegel's theory of finite cognition in Marx's critique of classical political economy. I argue that Hegel's distinction of finite cognition between analytic and synthetic in the Science of Logic constitutes the methodological framework through which Marx delineates the different stages of the development of political economy. Focusing on the Grundrisse, I reveal the Hegelian influence behind Marx's statements on previous political economists’ methods. Thus, Marx's immanent critique of the classical political economy is construed as (...) undertaken from the level of the systematic dialectical method of Capital, and is modelled on Hegel's immanent critique of analytic and synthetic cognition from the perspective of absolute cognition. In this context, and focusing on Marx's critique of Ricardo's method, I argue that the latter's limitations are associated with the deficiencies of synthetic cognition as presented by Hegel. Therefore, the article sheds light on an important yet underexplored topic of the Hegel-Marx relationship. By indicating the centrality of Hegel's theory of finite cognition in Marx's methodological underpinnings, the article provides a new perspective on Hegel-Marx scholarship. (shrink)