Recent studies have investigated connections between Adam Smith’s economic and philosophical ideas and Catholic Social Teaching (CST). Scholars argue that their common background lies in their respective anthropologies, both endorsing a relational view of human beings. I raise one main concern regarding these analyses. I suggest that the relationality endorsed by Smith lacks a central element present in CST—the other-oriented perspective which is the intentional concern for promoting the good of others. Some key elements of CST, such as love, gift, (...) gratuitousness, and fraternity, find a very different space in Smith’s social view and very little space in his economic view. Moreover, I show how CST relationality is more in accordance with a civil economy view of the market as a place of fraternity and mutual assistance. (shrink)

Adam Smith’s is often falsely portrayed as having argued that radical selfishness is a force for the good and that this “invisible hand’ is his market mechanism. This paper argues that Smith’s real market mechanism, the sympathy manoeuvre, is a viable alternative to Schumpeterian and mainstream models of innovation in economics and also could help build a firmer theoretical basis for other approaches such as Responsible Innovation. To Smith all human activity was social and must be understood and explained in (...) terms of the sentiments involved. Discovery, for instance, is driven by three sentiments (wonder, surprise, admiration), economic activities by sympathetic imagination, the need for exchange, the need to better one’s position in life, and the need for gratitude. Through sympathetic imagination, his famous model of the impartial spectator, Smith elegantly connects the individual and society. Smith’s innovation process is thus an exercise in social construction and not a destructive process based on radical selfishness. The paper argues that this social innovation process is a viable alternative to the extant approaches that are essentially asocial and amoral (economism) or ideologically normative (Responsible Innovation). (shrink)

Whether or not capitalism is compatible with ethics is a long standing dispute. We take up an approach to virtue ethics inspired by Adam Smith and consider how market competition influences the virtues most associated with modern commercial society. Up to a point, competition nurtures and supports such virtues as prudence, temperance, civility, industriousness and honesty. But there are also various mechanisms by which competition can have deleterious effects on the institutions and incentives necessary for sustaining even these most commercially (...) friendly of virtues. It is often supposed that if competitive markets are good, more competition must always be better. However, in the long run competition enhancing policies that neglect the nurturing and support of the bourgeois virtues may undermine the continued flourishing of modern commercial society. (shrink)

Both Adam Smith and Herbert spencer, albeit in quite different ways, have been enormously influential in what we today take to be philosophies of modern capitalism. Surprisingly it is Spencer, not Smith, who is the individualist, perhaps an egoist, and supports a "night watchman" theory of the state. Smith's concept of political economy is a notion that needs to be revisited, and Spencer's theory of democratic workplace management offers a refreshing twist on contemporary libertarianism.

In this paper we will analyze the relationship between free market principles and ethics through an exploration of how too many business managers often approach the ideas of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman. In doing so, we aim to provide a thoughtful foundation for future discussions of how we ought to navigate this intersection. We briefly examine questions such as: What is the relationship between the “best” economy in terms of efficiency and the common good for society? Is pursuing one’s (...) individual economic advantage the same as promoting the general interest? As we analyze and discuss these questions, specifically in the context of Smith and Friedman, we also make some alternative normative assertions, grounded in social welfare, about adopting a broader societal perspective for the purpose of business. (shrink)

Přes rozšířené používání pojmu společné dobro byla mezi antickými a středověkými mysliteli pozoruhodná nejednota o jeho konkrétním obsahu. Někdy bylo společné dobro chápáno jako dobro zúčastněných jednotlivců, jindy jako dobro společenství jako celku. Jakmile politická filozofie začala být stavěna na individualističtějších základech, společné dobro jako pojem ustoupilo do pozadí. Společné dobro by mělo mít dvě vlastnosti: jde o dobro a navíc společné. Dobro však není vnitřní kvalita o sobě, nýbrž subjektivní hodnocení člověka. Zda považujeme určité jednání či situaci za dobré (...) či špatné, záleží na našem hodnocení. Základní vlastností každého hodnocení je jeho subjektivita. Subjektivita v pojetí dobra je hlavním problémem společného dobra. Společné dobro může být společné pouze, když jde o cíl, který je sdílený všemi rozumnými aktéry uvnitř politického společenství. Má-li společné dobro být cílem regulujícím politické úvahy a zdrojem loajality ke společenství, muselo by být všemi sdíleno. To však v praxi je nesmírně obtížné zaručit. Neutrální hlasovací mechanismus, který by rozhodl, co je společné dobro, neexistuje. Společné dobro je příliš vágní pojetí, aby bylo užitečné v politické teorii a praktické politice. Veřejný zájem musí být posuzován partikulárně a lokálně, vždy s ohledem na zvláštní doby a místa. Co vytváří obecný zájem či "společné dobro", nevyplývá z filozofické teorie, ale praxe. Ačkoli společné dobro může být užitečné v politické i církevní rétorice, jeho vědecký smysl je omezený, nebo dokonce nulový. (shrink)