Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Moral Fixed Points, Error Theory and Intellectual Vice.Christos Kyriacou - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):1785-1794.
    Ingram (2015) has argued that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s (2014) ‘moral fixed points’ theory entails that error theorists are conceptually deficient with moral concepts. They are conceptually deficient with moral concepts because they do not grasp moral fixed points (e.g. ‘Torture for fun is pro tanto wrong’). Ingram (2015) concluded that moral fixed points theory cannot substantiate the conceptual deficiency charge and, therefore, the theory is defeated. In defense of moral fixed points theory, Kyriacou (2017a) argued that the theory is coherent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark