The central claims defended in this article are the following: (a) The social and ethical challenges of nanotechnology can be fully identified only if both the characteristic features of nanotechnologies and the social contexts into which they are emerging are considered. (b) When this is done, a host of significant social context issues, or issues that arise as a result of problematic features of the social contexts into which nanotechnology is emerging, become salient. (c) These issues can only be addressed (...) by remedying the problematic features of the social contexts, which cannot be accomplished by technology design or risk management alone. (d) The U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative's conceptualization and operationalization of responsible development does not adequately recognize the significance of social context issues to responsible development. (e) Therefore, the National Nanotechnology Initiative is not yet comprehensive and needs to be expanded with respect to identifying and addressing social context issues. (shrink)

Philosophy of the city has recently emerged as a new subfield, garnering global interest. While most inquiries in this area have ‘the city’ or an urban issue as common ground, particular approaches engage in a kind of study identified as ‘intra-disciplinary research.’ An intra-disciplinary approach draws from different areas of philosophy to address problems that extend beyond the limits of individual subfields. A close examination reveals that this practice challenges assumptions holding that definitively answering philosophical questions is the only path (...) to progress. Engaging in this kind of research adds to philosophy’s set of methods, and shows promise for philosophers wrestling with complex issues. (shrink)

In this paper I engage interdisciplinary conversation on inaction as the dominant response to climate change, and develop an analysis of the specific phenomenon of complacency through a critical-feminist lens. I suggest that Chris Cuomo's discussion of the “insufficiency” problem and Susan Sherwin's call for a “public ethics” jointly point toward particularly promising harm-reduction strategies. I draw upon and extend their work by arguing that extant philosophical accounts of complacency are inadequate to the task of sorting out what it means (...) to be complacent on climate change. I offer a sketch for an alternative account, which I take to be a start in the direction of mapping out a diverse array of “motivational vices” that need to be named, grappled with, and remedied. (shrink)

Environmental justice refers to many things: a global activist movement, local groups that struggle to redress the inequitable distribution of environmental goods (and bads), especially as they affect minority communities, as well as a vast body of interdisciplinary scholarship documenting and motivating these movements. In the past three decades, scholarly debates over what environmental justice requires have been dominated by a discourse of rights.