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  1. (1 other version)Contemporary Epistemology: Kant, Hegel, McDowell.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):274–301.
    Argues inter alia that Kant and Hegel identified necessary conditions for the possibility of singular cognitive reference that incorporate avant la lettre Evans’ (1975) analysis of identity and predication, that Kant’s and Hegel’s semantics of singular cognitive reference are crucial to McDowell’s account of singular thoughts, and that McDowell has neglected (to the detriment of his own view) these conditions and their central roles in Kant’s and in Hegel’s theories of knowledge. > Reprinted in: J. Lindgaard, ed., John McDowell: Experience, (...)
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  • Does Kantian mental content externalism help metaphysical realists?Axel Mueller - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):449-473.
    Standard interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism take it as a commitment to the view that the objects of cognition are structured or made by conditions imposed by the mind, and therefore to what Van Cleve calls “honest-to-God idealism”. Against this view, many more recent investigations of Kant’s theory of representation and cognitive significance have been able to show that Kant is committed to a certain form of Mental Content Externalism, and therefore to the realist view that the objects involved in (...)
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  • How Kant Justifies Freedom of Agency.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1695-1717.
    This paper argues that the problem of the apparent conflict between freedom of action and natural causal determinism has not been properly framed, because the key premiss—the thesis of universal causal determinism—is, in the domain of human behaviour, an unjustified conjecture based on over-simplified, under-informed explanatory models. Kant's semantics of singular cognitive reference, which stands independently of his Transcendental Idealism, justifies and emphasises a quadruple distinction between causal description, causal ascription, true causal ascription and cognitively justified causal ascription. Contemporary causal (...)
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  • Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule Four of Philosophy and Scientific Realism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2011 - Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 63 (1-2):27-49.
    Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason contains an original and powerful semantics of singular cognitive reference which has important implications for epistemology and for philosophy of science. Here I argue that Kant’s semantics directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of Philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force. I begin with Newton’s Rule 4 of Philosophy and its role in Newton’s justification of realism about gravitational force (§2). Next I briefly summarize Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (§3), (...)
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